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This thesis analyzes the defense capability of Japan Maritime Self-Defense 
Force(JMSDF) in the post-Cold War era. The primary research question is: " 
What changes will and should be expected for JMSDF after the collapse of the 
former Soviet Union?" To answer this question, I reviewed the defense capability 
buildup program during Cold-War, and made briefly analyzed the relationships 
among the Asian-Pacific countries, including U.S. Pacific forces and Russia. I 
also conducted a cost/benefit and personnel analysis of the current fleet 
configuration and a proposed new configuration. These alternatives may require 
drastic changes in public attitudes based on serious discussions among the 
Japanese people and politicians, and a tighter Japan-U.S. relationship on both 
economic issues and national security burden sharing. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
The end of the Cold War caused a great change in the 
strategic environment and significantly reduced the possibility 
of world-scale war. Consequently, the United States, the former 
Soviet Union, and European countries are promoting plans to 
further avoid confrontation. A movement towards arms control and 
disarmament has gained momentum.1 On the other hand, various 
local conflicts due to religious or ethnic problems are on the 
rise in many parts of the world. 
In the Asian-Pacific area, however, no major changes 
similar to those in Europe have occurred. Issues such as the 
rightful ownership of Japan's Northern Territories, Korean 
Peninsula, and the Spratly Islands remain even after the end of 
the Cold War. With regard to the Spratlys' situation, China is 
trying to modernize its armed forces and strengthen its position 
in the surrounding area. This is of great concern to nearby 
countries. 
Today, many Southeast Asian countries are increasingly 
modernizing their forces and purchasing advanced weapons. One 
could say that this region might present the greatest challenge 
to peace during the 21st century. Although the Japan-U.S 
security relationship will continue to be valuable in preserving 
stability in this region, a shifting American strategy in 
conjunction with a continued downsizing of American forces in 
the region could affect Japan's policy. 
The Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) is also 
facing many tough decisions regarding its military budget and 
strategy. Downsizing and reconfiguration of the JMSDF must take 
1Defense of Japan 1994 (Defense Agency) 
into account not only domestic considerations, but also the 
dynamic and shifting security environment of the region. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to study JMSDF's future 
mission and capability in the context of declining Japanese GNP 
growth, a changing U.S. presence in the Pacific, the diminished 
Russian threat, and an increased Chinese maritime capability. In 
contrast to the certainty in the Cold War-era, Japan is facing a 
more dynamic and potentially uncertain geographical and economic 
environment. In view of these changing circumstances, this study 
examines the costs and benefits of various budget alternatives, 
R&D choices and fleet-mixes for the JMSDF. 
The primary research question is what changes will and 
should be expected for the JMSDF after the collapse of the 
former Soviet Union? 
Three subsidiary questions follow: 
1. What will be the JMSDF mission in the post-Cold War 
period? 
2. What will be the JMSDF's budget, R&D and fleet-mix 
options? 
3. What are the resources and political constraints for 
these options? 
C. FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH 
1. Outline 
This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter II reviews 
the defense capability and mission of the JMSDF during the Cold 
War. Chapter III includes an estimate of the future military 
balance in East Asia. Chapter IV includes cost/benefit and 
personnel analyses of alternative fleet configurations and R&D 
strategies. Chapter V provides findings and a conclusion. 
2. Methodology 
Data will be collected from the Japan Maritime Staff Office 
in Tokyo as well as from the Japanese government and commercial 
publications, and "Military Balance." The military balance in 
the region will be quantified using data from the JMSDF Staff 
Office and other open sources. 
II.  DEFENSE CAPABILITY AND MISSION OF JMSDF 
DURING THE COLD WAR 
A. MILITARY SITUATION AROUND JAPAN DURING THE COLD WAR 
The global military situation has developed within the 
basic framework of military confrontation between the Western 
and Eastern collective systems, centering respectively on the 
United States and the Soviet Union. This focus dominated from 
the end of W.W.II until the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union possessed powerful nuclear 
forces. In addition, they deployed enormous ground and air 
forces in their territory, as well as in East European countries 
and the Far East. To counter the Soviet threat, the United 
States provided its allies with a so-called "nuclear umbrella." 
They further deployed ground and air forces to allied countries 
in Europe and Asia on the Soviet Union's periphery. This 
signaled their defense commitment to the allies. 
Under the aforementioned conditions, the Far East has been 
an area of great importance in the U.S.-Soviet relationship of 
military confrontation across the Pacific Ocean. Japan is 
located at the eastern end of the Far East, on the most vital 
sea route leading to the Pacific Ocean from the Asian continent 
thorough the Sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan, the East China 
Sea, and other adjoining areas. This means that Japan is 
invaluable in any military confrontation between the U.S and the 
Soviet Union. 
Both geographically and historically, the Korean Peninsula 
has been intimately related to Japan. Maintenance of peace and 
stability on the Korea Peninsula has a significant bearing on 
the peace and stability in Eastern Asia, including Japan. There 
has been no immediate prospect for peace through dialogue 
between North and South Korea. More than 1,200,000 ground 
personnel from the two countries stand guard against each other 
across the DMZ. 
China has been striving to modernize its equipment. This 
rapid modernization presents an increasingly difficult 
condition. Though the relations between China and the Soviet 
Union have shown signs of improving in recent years, no basic 
change had been observed in the military confrontation between 
the two countries. 
B. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SEA POWER AND JMSDF'S MISSION 
Japan relies heavily on others for its supply of resources, 
energy, food and other materials that are vital to its 
existence. Therefore, defending its surrounding sea areas and 
securing the safety of maritime traffic are extremely important. 
Secure lines of communication provide a foundation for its 
national existence. During the Cold War, it was believed that 
Japan's maritime traffic would be obstructed by attacks on ships 
sailing around Japan and by the mining of Japanese ports and 
harbors using Soviet submarines, aircraft, and surface ships. 
Therefore, JMSDF needs to maintain safety for maritime 
traffic by foiling the advance of enemy forces and reducing 
their strength. The JMSDF also needs to effectively block enemy 
operations through surveillance, escort operations and extensive 
defense measures for ports, harbors, and straits. 
The JMSDF has the following missions in order to achieve 
these objectives: 
• In surrounding water areas, anti-submarine units (fixed-wing anti- 
submarine patrol aircraft) will patrol wide areas, while destroyers 
will patrol key shipping lanes to gain control of enemy ships 
deployed in the ocean to attack Japanese shipping. In addition, 
destroyers and anti-submarine units will escort ships whenever 
necessary.   While patrolling in Japan's territorial waters and 
escorting ships, the JMSDF will wage anti-submarine, anti-surface 
ship and air defense warfare. 
• In coastal areas, mine sweeping units, anti-submarine patrol units, 
(chiefly anti-submarine helicopters), and destroyers deploy in and 
around key ports and harbors where shipping traffic is particularly 
thick, to secure the safety of ships. In this case, anti-submarine 
and mine warfare will be waged appropriately to counter the enemy 
threat. 
• In key straits, destroyers, submarines, and anti-submarine aircraft 
will wage anti-submarine, anti-surface ship, and mine warfare against 
enemy ships  attempting to  force their way through such straits. 
• In air operations at sea, destroyers will carry out air defense 
operations to protect ships.^ 
C.    DEFENSE   CAPABILITY   BUILD-UP   PROGRAM   DURING   THE   COLD 
WAR 
After World War II, Japan was occupied by the Allied 
powers, and its military system was dramatically reformed, 
including disbanding the armed forces. Among the Allied Powers, 
the Soviet Union maintained its massive military might and 
spread its influence and military control over East European 
countries and other areas. In spite of the U.S., the Soviet 
Union increased troop mobilization and built-up its military. 
Because of this, the free world countries sensed a crisis and 
formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with the 
United States at its core. At the same time, the Soviet Union 
strengthened its alliance and sphere of influence by 
establishing the Warsaw Pact Organization  (WPO). 
1.   The   1950's 
The Korean War broke out in 1950, amid the currents of 
East-West confrontation. Since the U.S. Forces stationed in 
Japan were deployed to the Korean Peninsula, Japan formed the 
National Police Reserve Force to maintain public security. The 
Peace Treaty with the U.S. and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty 
^Defense of Japan 1994(Japan Defense Agency) p83 
were signed in 1951. Japan restored its sovereignty and started 
as a new member of the free world. The National Police Reserve 
Force merged with the Maritime Guard Force into the National 
Safety Agency. The Defense Agency and the Self Defense Force 
(SDF) were instituted in Japan to protect against direct or 
indirect invasion. 
Japan adopted its "Basic Policy for National Defense/' 
which later served as the primary guideline for defense policies 
(see Appendix A). Based on these policies, Japan formulated a 
series of defense build-up programs to establish a defense 
foundation. 
The 1st Defense Build-up Plan (1958-1960) focused on 
increasing the mainstay of the defense establishment by 
improving the ground defense capability. It also developed some 
maritime and air defense capabilities. This plan served to 
offset the reduction of U.S. land forces stationed in Japan, 
which were being rapidly re deployed. This program's 
achievements are presented in Table l.3 
Basic unit 
Anti-submarine Surface-ship Units(for 3 escort flotillas 
mobile operations) 
Anti-submarine Surface-ship 5 divisions 
Units(district units) 
Submarine Units - 
Minesweeping Units 1 minesweeping flotilla 
Land-based Anti-Submarine Aircraft Units 9 divisions 
Main Equipment 
Anti-Submarine Surface Ships 57 ships 
Submarine 2 Submarines 
Combat Aircraft (approx. 220 aircrafts) 
Sources: Defense of Japan 1994 
Table 1. Achievements of the 1st Defense Build-up Plan. 
■^Defense of Japan 1994 (Defense agency) pi06 
2. The 1960's 
Two significant changes occurred in this decade. First, 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union began negotiations and 
collaboration to avert confrontation of critical proportions. 
The 1962 Cuban missile crisis4 served as the momentum. These 
efforts crystallized in the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 
signed in 1963, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT 
I), signed in 1972, among others. However, the East-West 
confrontation continued. 
Second, an inclination toward multi-polarization become 
obvious in both the East and West camps. In 1966, France 
withdrew from NATO to pursue its own military policies. NATO 
itself changed from a unilateral reliance on the United States 
to cooperation between the United States and West European 
countries. Due in part to a downturn in its economic might, the 
United States began to seek increased defense participation by 
its allies, to lessen its own defense burden. In the East camp, 
the Sino-Soviet conflict surfaced and become increasingly 
intense. Moves toward liberalization in East Europe were 
contained after the military interference in Czechoslovakia in 
1968 by the Soviet Union and its allies.5 
Given an atmosphere ripe for conflict, the 2nd Defense 
Build-up Plan (1962-1966) was formulated with its main focus on 
improving the defense capabilities. This plan's goal was to 
counter a small, conventional invasion of Japan. The scale of 
the hypothetical invasion was smaller than that of a local war. 
The 3rd Defense Build-up Plan (1969-1971) continued this 
objective.   To attain this goal,  the plan improved and 
4In the crisis, it was learned that the Soviet Union was installing 
medium-range missiles in Cuba, and the United States forced the Soviet 
Union to withdraw the missiles by conducting a maritime blockade and 
other measures against Cuba. 
5Defense of Japan 1994 (defense Agency) pl07 
reinforced the quantity and quality of the Ground, Maritime and 
Air Self-Defense Forces considering diverse conditions at home 
and abroad. 
Regarding Japan-U.S. security, a strong military posture 
added support "to the U.S. military's right to be stationed in 
Japan. Therefore, Japan proposed revising the treaty so that the 
Japanese military could realistically be developed in time of 
war. The treaty was subsequently revised into its current form 
and signed in 1960. 
The results of the second and third Defense Build-up Plans 
are presented in Tables 2 and 3.6 
Basic unit 
3 escort flotillas Anti-submarine Surface-ship Units(for 
mobile operations) 
Anti-submarine Surface-ship 5 divisions 
Units(district units) 
Submarine Units 2 divisions 
Minesweeping Units 2 minesweeping flotilla 
Land-based Anti-Submarine Aircraft Units 15 divisions 
Main Equipment 
Anti-Submarine Surface Ships 59 ships 
Submarine 7 Submarines 
Combat Aircraft (approx. 230 aircrafts) 
Sources: Defense of Japan 1994 
Table 2. Achievements of the 2nd Defense Build-up Plan. 
"Defense of Japan 1994 ( Defense Agency) 
Basic unit 
4 escort flotillas Anti-submarine Surface-ship Units(for 
mobile operations) 
Anti-submarine Surface-ship 10 divisions 
Units(district units) 
Submarine Units 4 divisions 
Minesweeping Units 2 minesweeping flotilla 
Land-based Anti-Submarine Aircraft Units 14 divisions 
Main Equipment 
Anti-Submarine Surface Ships 59 ships 
Submarine 12 Submarines 
Combat Aircraft (approx. 240 aircrafts) 
Sources: Defense of Japan 1994 
Table 3. Achievements of the 3rd Defense Build-up Plan 
3. The 1970's 
In the first half of the 1970's, dialogue between the 
United States and Soviet Union made headway, and East-West 
relations developed some stability through so-called "detente." 
Under these circumstances, the 4th Defense Build-up Plan(1972- 
1976) was formulated. However, the numbers of tanks, ships, and 
aircraft in this plan were scaled back in 1975. This revision 
was necessary because of deteriorating economic and fiscal 
situations after the first oil crisis. 
The "National Defense Program Outline" was formulated in 
1976, based on the current international situation. It 
considered recruiting problems and other domestic factors. The 
achievements of the 4th Defense Build-up Plan and National 
Defense Program Outline are presented in Tables 4 and 5.7 
'Defense of Japan 1994 (Defense Agency) 
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Basic unit 
Anti-submarine Surface-ship Units(for 4 escort flotillas 
mobile operations) 
Anti-submarine Surface-ship 9 divisions 
Units(district units) 
Submarine Units 5 divisions 
Minesweeping Units 2 minesweeping flotilla 
Land-based Anti-Submarine Aircraft Units 16 divisions 
Main Equipment 
Anti-Submarine Surface Ships 60 ships 
Submarine 15 Submarines 
Combat Aircraft (approx. 240 aircrafts) 
Sources: Defense of Japan 1994 
Table 4. Achievements of the 4th Defense Build-up Plan 
Basic unit 
4 escort flotillas Anti-submarine Surface-ship Units(for 
mobile operations) 
Anti-submarine Surface-ship 10 divisions 
Units(district units) 
Submarine Units 6 divisions 
Minesweeping Units 2 minesweeping flotilla 
Land-based Anti-Submarine Aircraft Units 16 divisions 
Main Equipment 
Anti-Submarine Surface Ships 60 ships 
Submarine 16 Submarines 
Combat Aircraft (approx. 240 aircrafts) 
Sources:   Defense of Japan 1994 
Table 5.  Achievements of the National Defense Program Outline 
4.   The   1980's 
The Soviet Union initiated domestic reforms (perestroika, 
etc.) under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985. A 
policy of collaboration was adopted with the West. As a result, 
arms control and disarmament between the West and East 
progressed, slowing the expansion of the Soviet Union's 
influence on Third World countries. 
11 
The democratization of East European nations progressed 
rapidly. In 1989, the Berlin Wall collapsed, and the "end to the 
Cold War" was declared at the U.S.-Soviet summit in Malta. The 
Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) was dissolved in 1991, and the 
Soviet Union itself subsequently disintegrated. 
12 
III.    FUTURE   MILITARY   BALANCE   IN   EAST   ASIA 
The end of the Cold War greatly changed the strategic 
environment. The United States, the former Soviet Union, and 
European countries made plans to reduce and restructure surplus 
war supplies. These countries moved away from an East-West 
confrontation and towards arms control and disarmament. 
On the other hand, various local regional and ethnic 
disputes, previously constrained under the East-West 
confrontation, began to surface or expand. Some countries in the 
Asian-Pacific area still faced complex military issues and 
difficult decisions based on their visions of national security. 
There were still many unsettled issues, such as the Korean 
Peninsula, the Spratly Islands, and Japan's Northern 
Territories. A major movement towards peace initiatives, like 
that which occurred in Europe after the Cold War, has not taken 
place in the Asian-Pacific Area.   'Asian Security'   says: 
Changing circumstances,  however,   have made it necessary to 
examine the stresses being put on relations in Asian Security. 
The time is ripe for considering where international relations 
in the Asian-Pacific region are headed and what type of regional 
system would be desirable.° 
Against this background, many countries have been trying to 
improve and modernize their defense capabilities. As 'Asian 
Security' notes: 
Asian countries have moved in exactly the opposite direction. 
Their defense budgets have risen in actual terms, with much of the 
increase going towards the purchase of new weapons systems. These 
trends have led to concern that an arms race is now underway in 
Asia.9 
If so, what is the future military balance in East Asia? 
8ASIAN SECURITY 1994-1995 (Research Institute For Peace and Security) pi. 
9ASIAN SECURITY 1994-1995 (Research Institute For Peace and Security) pl3. 
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Answering this problem requires discussing the military 
situation in countries which have influence in the Asian- 
Pacific area, including: the United States, Russia, China, 
South Korea and North Korea. 
A. THE UNITED STATES 
The end of the Cold War caused a great change in the 
strategic environment and reduced the possibility of world-scale 
war. The United States promoted plans to avoid further 
confrontation. A movement towards arms control and disarmament 
gained momentum. However, some of the same issues still remain 
to be solved among the Asian-Pacific countries as existed during 
the Cold War. 
The United States has remained committed to protecting her 
own interests and those of her allies in the Asian-Pacific area. 
The deployment of the Pacific Command, a unified command 
consisting of Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps units, has 
served as a deterrent to conflict. 
The Bush administration adopted the "East Asia Strategic 
Initiative" (EASI) and made it clear that the U.S. would 
continue to maintain bilateral arrangements and forward-deployed 
forces. In November 1991, U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney 
stated six principles concerning U.S. strategy in East Asia, as 
follows: 
Guarantee of U.S. commitment to the Asian-Pacific region. 
A strong framework of bilateral security arrangements. 
Maintenance of a forward deployed presence of highly 
competent forces, though not big in scale. 
Ensuring enough bases overseas to support forward deployed 
forces. 
Greater responsibility of Asian allies for their own 
security. 
14 
Complementary defense cooperation with the allied countries 
in the region even after the end of the Cold War.10 
The Clinton administration has stated that the U.S. will 
maintain its involvement and a strong military presence in this 
region.11 According to the "Bottom-Up Review" announced in 1993, 
the U.S. will continue to deploy nearly 100,000 military 
personnel in East Asia, including the Marine Corps and Air Force 
in Japan, and the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific. 
However, 'Asian Security' says, "Despite U.S. assurances 
that the U.S. Military will remain engaged in Asia, there is a 
chance that the U.S. defense budget, domestic difficulties, 
and/or isolationist pressures will cause a larger and quicker 
departure of U.S. forces than expected."12 
Figure 1 shows the trend of the U.S.'s major naval forces 
deployed in the Pacific from 1985 to 1993. Figure 1 illustrates 
the reduction of naval forces in spite of the U.S.'s strategic 
statements (see Appendix B). 
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Figure 1 . Major U.S. Naval Forces Deployed in the Pacific; 
1985-1993 
B. RUSSIA 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been in 
a transitional period, shifting from totalitarianism to 
democracy and from socialism to capitalism. In this environment, 
the Russian military has faced serious problems. There has been 
considerable debate concerning the new military doctrine and 
adjusting to the post-Cold War security environment. Defense 
Minister Grachev described the military doctrine that the 
Russian Security Council eventually adopted as follows: 
The new doctrine emphasizes preventing/deterring war in the 
absence of any identified potential external threats, and the use of 
military forces for defensive purpose only. The major purpose of 
Russian military forces is to protect Russia's vital national 
interests (the conventional order,  sovereignty, and territorial 
integrity) from military threats.I3 
13ASIAN SECURITY 1994-1995 (Research Institute For Peace and Security) p 
71. 
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Russian military forces are to be organized around two 
major principles. According to 'Asian Security:' 
First, strategic nuclear forces will be maintained to deter 
nuclear and conventional war at the global level. In the event that 
Russia is attacked with conventional weapons by another nuclear state 
it will consider nuclear retaliation, but it will also consider such 
a defense against non-nuclear states belonging to a military bloc 
that includes nuclear-armed states. Russia has reserved this right to 
resort to nuclear weapons for defensive purposes because it will not 
be able to provide a non-nuclear defense against the West's high 
technology weapons. 
The second major principle is to prevent, or contain, local or 
regional wars by maintaining highly mobile military forces 
(officially known as Constant Readiness Troops [CRT]). Russia intends 
to reduce the size of its military to 1.5 million men. The 
establishment of the CRT force is expected to compensate for the 
reduction in size.l* 
In the middle of November 1993, President Yeltsin mentioned 
special measures to allow Russia to catch up with the West in 
high-technology. Yeltsin was concerned, among other things, 
with the Western precision-guided munitions (PGMs). The Russian 
military has started to adjust its military doctrine from 
emphasizing quantity to focusing on quality. This is evident in 
the continuous modernization of forces in the Far East. 
1. Nuclear Forces 
Strategic nuclear forces in the Far East include ICBMs and 
strategic bombers deployed along the Siberian railway, and ballistic 
missile mounted nuclear submarines (SSBNs), such as Delta Ill-class 
nuclear submarines carrying SLBMs, deployed in the sea area centering 
on the Sea of Okhotsk. The ICBM has been modernized in the form of 
the SS-25 and others. The mainstay of the strategic bomber is the TU- 
95, which can carry AS-15 cruise missiles with a range of about 3,000 
kilometers. With regards to SSBN's, old subs are coming out of 
service, but the readiness posture is maintained. 
14ASIAN SECURITY 1994-1995 (Research Institute For Peace and Security) 
P71. 
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2. Ground Forces 
Russian ground forces in the Far East region have been reduced 
in scale since 1990, and at present their strength totals 27 army 
divisions with approximately 240,000 personnel. Part of the army 
divisions have recently been reorganized as machine-gun and artillery 
divisions, which are central to regional defense. Some other reduced 
divisions in which the fill-ratio of personnel is less than 5 percent 
while equipment is almost 100 percent, have been transformed into 
mobilization bases, where the divisions can be restored to a full- 
fledged ordinary division by returning personnel level to fighting 
strength. In qualitative development, state-of-the-art T-80 tanks 
have been sent to the region since 1990. Modernization also continues 
with the development of such equipment as armed infantry combat 
vehicles, multiple-launch rocket vehicles, heavy artillery, and armed 
helicopters. 
3. Naval Forces 
The Pacific Fleet, the largest of the former Soviet Union's 
four naval fleets, is primarily based in Vladivostok and 
Petropavlofsk. The Pacific Fleet is comprised of approximately 745 
ships with total displacement of about 1,890,000 tons, which include 
some 65 major surface ships.  It also includes about 70 submarines 
(including 50 nuclear submarines) with an aggregate displacement of 
approximately 650,000 tons. 
In recent years, the Pacific Fleet has been on the decline in 
quantitative terms, with two aircraft carriers being taken out of 
service, and its activity toned down. But it has continued to be 
modernized with the addition of Oscar-II-class cruise missile-mounted 
nuclear submarines and construction of Akula-class nuclear-powered 
attack submarines. The Pacific Fleet also has Ivan Rogov-class and 
other amphibious assault landing ships, the Ro/Flo type large 
transport ship "Anadyr" with a cargo capability of about 10,000 tons, 
and a naval infantry division. This provides significant amphibious 
operation capabilities. Furthermore, the fleet possesses LASH and 
Ro/Ro commercial ships, both of which can be diverted for military 
purposes. 
4. Aviation Forces 
Russia deploys approximately 1,220 combat aircraft in the Far 
East. Although the number of such aircraft has decreased, the quality 
continues to improve as the disposition of fourth-generation 
fighters. Incidentally, some third-generation fighters, which were 
taken out of service, are considered to be in storage without being 
scrapped. *■$ 
^Defense of Japan 1994 (Defense Agency) p43. 
18 
Figure 2 shows major Russian naval forces in the Far East 
from 1985 to 1994. This figure illustrates the quantitative 
decrease in ships during this period (see Appendix C for total 
Russian Naval Forces). 
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Figure 2. Major Russian Naval Force in Far East:  1985-1994 
C. CHINA 
After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, China suddenly looks more threatening.16 China is 
taking advantage of a buyer's market in Russian equipment and is 
beginning to expand into the void left by the scaled-down U.S. 
presence. Last year the Chinese finally claimed all the disputed 
Spratley Islands as sovereign territory and are reinforcing 
their island garrisons. They are also basing squadrons of newly- 
acquired Russian fighter bombers within striking range. 
Concerning China's future,   'Asian Security'   states that: 
Two schools of thought have sprung up concerning China's 
future.   Some analyses  see disruption developing with China possibly 
16Jane's   Information   Group,    Jane's   Fighting   Ship   1994-1995,    Butler   and 
Tanner Ltd.,   London,   1988. 
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splitting up, while others predict that China will become a 21st 
century superpower. These two scenarios, which initially appear 
contradictory, do not necessarily preclude one another. China may 
indeed suffer a period of dislocation, but it could then right 
itself, becoming an economic and military superpower.^? 
In August 1993, Liu Huaqing's vision for the Chinese 
military was published in the Chinese journal 'Qiushi (Seeking 
Truth)' and in a newspaper published by the PLA (People's 
Liberation Army), 'Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily).' His 
vision is certain to be an important contribution to discussions 
on China's choice of strategy. He delineated the limits for the 
use of military forces, and focused attention on the necessity 
of defending Chinese air, land and sea areas. Similarly, on 
July 31, 1994, Chi Haotian suggested adopting a military 
strategy and a national security policy that emphasizes 
territorial defense. 
From this evidence, it appears that Chinese military 
leaders do not think China is currently prepared for a large- 
scale conflict. The Chinese military intends to modernize as 
necessary to fight a modern war with state-of-the -art military 
technology. 
Chinese military leaders are emphasizing developing the 
Navy and Air Force.18 The foreword of 'Jane's fighting ship 
1994-1995' states: 
Rumors that China is building an aircraft carrier at Kuznetsov 
class carrier Varyag, building at Nikolayev, proved to be inaccurate, 
but there is no doubt that a multi-aircraft platform is a high 
priority naval requirement. A helicopter carrier, possibly a merchant 
conversion, is a more likely first step. But as Chinese and Russian 
commercial links appear to be strengthening, anything is possible, 
and transformation of second-hand ships can happen very quickly. An 
expansionist maritime policy is not an option given the current state 
of Fleet training and equipment. Nonetheless the Navy is a credible 
17ASIAN SECURITY 1994-1995 (Research Institute For Peace and Security) p 
75. 
18ASIAN SECURITY 1994-1995 (Research Institute For Peace and Security) p96. 
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force in coastal regions and in support of land forces, and building 
a 'quality Navy' is now a stated Chinese objective.*■* 
Figure 3 shows the major Chinese naval forces from 1985 to 
1994. This figure illustrates that despite the decline in the 
number of ships, full tonnage increased after FY1991 (see 
Appendix D). China seems to have shifted to constructing larger 
ships that can accommodate ship-borne helicopters. During 1991, 
the first ship-borne helicopter force began operating as a 
formal detachment of the Navy.20 
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Figure 3.  Major Chinese Naval Forces:     1985-1994 
D.   SOUTH   KOREA 
The Republic of South Korea has several national security 
concerns: its capital is situated very close to the 
demilitarized zone (DMZ), it is surrounded by sea on three 
sides, and it has numerous inlets along its long coastline. More 
19 Jane's Information Group, Jane's fighting   ship    1994-1995,    Butler and 
Tanner Ltd., London, 1995. 
20 ASIAN SECURITY 1992-1993(Research Institute For Peace and Security) p94. 
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recently, the threat of nuclear weapons has grown, with North 
Korea refusing to allow inspections by the International Atomic 
Energy Authority. South Korea has been spending around 4 percent 
of its GNP on national defense every year, concentrating on 
North Korea's enormous ground forces as the major threat. 
'Jane's Fighting Ship' states: 
The South Korean Navy is speeding up its submarine program, 
giving unusual publicity to the launch last October of the first hull 
built by Daewoo, while the first of the class which was built in 
Germany is already in service. The Koreans are not having problems 
building advanced submarines that have plagued countries such as 
India and Argentina. The KDX frigate program has been much less 
dynamic and has suffered countless delays. And it may now be 
overtaken by a new operational requirement for a much larger class of 
air defense destroyer. As an interim measure, more Ulsan class are 
being built. More mine hunters are also under construction. The first 
two LSTs are to start sea trials at the end of 1995.21 
In addition, South Korean military forces include 22 ground 
divisions with about 550,000 personnel, two marine divisions, 
and an Air Force with about 490 combat aircraft, including F-16 
fighters(see Appendix E). 
Figure 4 shows major South Korean naval ships from 1985 to 
1994. This figure illustrates an increase in the number of ships 
since 1988 (see Appendix F). 
^Jane's Information group,  Jane's fighting ship 1994-1995,Butler  and 
Tanner Ltd., London, 1995. 
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Figure 4.  Major South Korean Naval Forces:     1985-1994 
E.    NORTH   KOREA 
North Korean military forces have been enhanced since 1962 
under a four point military philosophy.22 Although North Korea 
may be suffering from a serious economic downturn, it has 
allocated a large percentage of national resources to its 
military forces. 
North Korea's military forces consist of 26 ground 
divisions with about 1 million personnel, a 620 ship Navy with 
a total displacement of 85,000 tons, and an Air Force with 810 
older combat aircraft made in China and the former Soviet Union. 
The Air Force also includes fourth generation aircraft such as 
the MIG-29 and the SU-25. 
Figure 5 shows the major North Korean naval forces from 
1985 to 1994. This figure illustrates that naval forces have 
been increasing since 1990 (see Appendix G). 
99 ■'■'Four point philosophy means 'the whole people will be armed, ' 'the whole 
country will be fortified,' 'all solders will be trained as a cadre,' 'all 
arms will be modernized.' 
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Figure 5. Major North Korean Naval Forces:  1985-1994 
F. SUMMARY 
Table 6 summarizes the events in the Asian-Pacific 
countries with security implications since the end of the Cold 
War. This table indicates that China looks increasingly 
threatening as the U.S. and Russia withdraw military forces from 
the Asian-Pacific area. 'Strategic Assessment 1995' states: 
Specifically, the Chinese leadership seeks to use diplomatic 
means and the specter of improving PLA military capabilities to 
put teeth into Chinese claims in the South China Sea.23 
23Strategic Assessment 1995 (INSTITUE NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES)   P2. 
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Gorbachev announces the reduction of 120,000 Soviet 
Far Easten forces, etc. 
Chinese security forces crack down on demonstrators 
at Tienamen Square. 
Vietnam declares it has withdrawn troops from 
Cambodia. 
GDR permits free departures to the West (Virtual 
demolition of the Berlin Wall) 





The Soviet Foreign military announces the 
complete withdrawal of MiG-23s and TU-16s from 
Gorbachev becomes the first Soviet president. 
North and South Korean prime ministers meet in first 
high-level contact (Seoul, till Sep.7) 










Soviet Defense Minister Yazov announces virtual 
completion of unilateral reduction of 500,000 
Soviet troops. 
U.S. DoD submits to Congress " A strategic 
Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim." 
Chinese Communist Party General Sectretary Jiang 
Zemin visits Soviet Union. Sino-Soviet agreement on 
eastern border formally signed. 
Russian President Yeltsin takes office. 
Soviet President Gorbachev announces proposals for 
reduction in nuclear arms. 
China and Vietnam issue joint statement, declaring 
normalization of government and party relations. 
South Korea President Roh announces removal of 
nuclear weapons from South Korea. 
Soviet President Gorbachev Resigns. 


















South Korea Defense Department announces 
cancellation of Team Sprit '92. 
U.S. President Bush announces a proposal on nuclear 
arms reduction. 
Russian President Yeltsin unveils proposal for 
reduction in CIS armed forces. 
North Korea signs safeguard agreement allowing IAEA 
inspection of nuclear facilities based on Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty. 
At the 6th high-level North-South talks, "the 
agreement on conciliation, non-aggression and 
exchange cooperation between North and South "and " 
the joint declaration concerning the 
denuclearization of the Korea Peninsula" effected. 
China enacts Territorial Water ACT designating 
Senkaku Islands as integral part of China. 
Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev says Soviet troops 
stationed on the Northern Territories were reduced 
by 30%, though 7,000 brigade-level forces still 
retained there. 
North Korea-IAEA nuclear safeguard agreement comes 
into force. 
IAEA officials make the first special inspection 
of North Korea's nuclear facilities. 
U.S.-Russia summit meeting, held in Washington, 
agrees on massive strategic arms reductions. 
Fidel Ramos takes office as president of the 
Philippines. 
U.S. and South Korea dissolve their joint field 
army command. 
U.S. President Bush announces the complete 
withdrawal of ground-and sea-deployed tactical 
nuclear weapons abroad to the U.S. 
Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev announces the 
continued maintenance of former Soviet military 
facilities in Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay. 
China and South Korea establish diplomatic 
relations. 
Russia announces the completion of work to withdraw 
Russia troops from Mongolia.  






14th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China is held(with emphasis on strengthening 
military forces and defending the sovereignty of 
territories, territorial waters and the right to 
and interests of marine resources). 
South Korean and Russian leaders sign the basic 
treaty between South Korea and Russia. 
U.S. completes withdrawal of its armed forces from 
the Philippines. 













Malaysia and India sign a memorandum on defense 
cooperation. 
Kim Young Sam become South Korean President. 
North Korea announces secession from nuclear 
nonproliferation treaty(NPT). 
U.S. Defense Secretary Aspin announces the shift of 
the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Office to 
the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Organization. 
North Korea reserves withdraw from NPT, in a 
joint statement issued as a result of the first 
round of U.S.-North Korea consultation. 
U.S. announces plans to close or reduce U.S. bases 
at home and abroad. 
U.S. President Clinton announces a concept for a 
"New Pacific Community" in a speech to South 
Korea's parliament. 
A high Russian military official confirms 
withdrawal of MiG-23s from Tennei Airfield on 
Etorofu Island. 
U.S. DOD announces the "Bottom-up Review." 
China conducts an underground nuclear test. 
China and Vietnam sign an agreement on basic 
principles regarding the solution of border and 
territorial issues. 







At a U.S.-Russia summit, the two countries agree to 
avoid having their strategic nuclear weapons target 
each other. 
North Korea rejects the U.N. Security Council 
chairman's statement adopted Mar.31. 
South Korea and Russian defense ministers sign a 
memorandum on mutual cooperation and military 
cooperation. 
U.S. announce a renewal for China is most 
favored national (MFN) treatment. 
U.S., Russia and Britain announce releases of their 
strategic nuclear weapons from attack targets. 
Table 6. (continued) 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF MANPOWER REQUIREMENT AND AN ALTERNATIVE 
FLEET CONFIGURATION 
A. JAPANESE DEFENSE EXPENDITURE 
1. Trends in Japanese Defense Expenditure  (DE) 
The ratio of defense expenditures to GNP has been under 1% 
since FY1967. The only exception was during the 3-year period 
from FY1987 through FY1989 in which the ratios were slightly 
over 1% (see Figure 6 and Appendix H for detail). In terms of 
trend, the ratio increased during the 1980's and has been 
decreasing since FY1990. 
With regards to the ratio of defense expenditures to the 
national budget, it decreased from 11.3% in FY1958 to 5.1% in 
FY1981. From FY1981 to FY1988 the ratio increased to 6.5% then 
turned down again until FY1993. It settled at 6.4% in FY1994. 
In comparison with the growth rate of other major budget 
items (Social Welfare, Education and Science, and Public Works), 
the growth rate of defense expenditures exceeded those of other 
major budget items for the first time in FY1981. This trend 
continued for nine years until FY1989 (see Figure 7 and Appendix 
I). However, since FY1991, the growth of defense expenditures 
decreased relative to all other expenditures. It showed a 
declining trend as follows; 3.8% in FY1992, 1.95% in FY1993, 
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Figure 7.    Major Account Growth Rate 
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2. JMSDF Budget 
a. Budget Comparisons Across Services 
Figure 8 shows each service's monetary budget from 
FY1974 to FY1992. This figure is consistent with an average 
overall budget growth of 5% per year. Figure 9 shows how each 
service's share of the budget changed from FY1975 to FY1992. In 
FY1992, JMSDF's portion is 24% of the defense budget and JASDF's 
portion is about 25%  (Appendix J and K). 
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Figure 9. Relative Share of Defense Budget by Service; 
1975-1992 
b.   JMSDF Budget 
Figure 10 breaks the total JMSDF budget into its three 
major expense items: personnel and provisions, current-year 
obligatory outlays, and current-year materials (see Appendix L). 
Similarly, the JMSDF budget can be divided into personnel and 
provisions, front-line expenditures and other expenditures. 
JMSDF's front-line expenditures include current year spending on 
ship and aircraft procurement and ammunition. Figure 11 divides 
JMSDF's front-line expenditures into its components: ships, 
aircraft and ammunition. Front-line expenditures represent the 
budget for the Defense Build-up Program. Front-line expenditures 
exceeded personnel and provision expenses starting in FY1980, 
with the growth of the Japanese economy. In front-line 
expenditures,  shipbuilding  and  aircraft  procurement  grew 
32 
srelative to ammunition until FY1980. This means the JMSDF gave 
higher priority to equipment than to logistics and readiness. 
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Figure 10.  JMSDF Budget by Element24 
24 Note:   1. Personnel & Provisions expense indicate payment for 
wages and meals. 
2. Current-year obligatory outlays expense indicate payment 
for authorized contract expense and continued projects 
expense. 
3. Current-year materials expense indicate payment for 
repair and improvement, training, purchasing oil, etc. 
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Figure 11. JMSDF Front-Line Expenditures by Component 
B.  SHIP COST ANALYSIS 
1. Shipbuilding Costs 
In order to find the trend in shipbuilding costs for each 
ship type, the cost/displacement for four ship types between the 
1960s and 1990s is computed and shown in Figures 12 through 15. 
The four ship types include: destroyers(DD), guided missile 
destroyers (DDG), escort destroyers(DE), and submarines(SS).25 
The cost is all expressed in constant 1985 year yen. 
25 Note:   1. Cost/Ton in these charts are in real Yens, Based on 
FY1985 prices and using FY1985 deflator.(1,000 yen). 
2. Line in the each chart indicates a trend line. 
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Figure 12. DD Shipbuilding Costs:  1960-1994 
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Figure 15. SS Shipbuilding Costs:  1960-1994 
The trend data indicates that the real shipbuilding cost 
per ton displacement on average has increased 3% annually for 
the last 30 years. The significant portion of the cost increase, 
36 
however, occurred around the "Oil Shock" of 1973.  The pre-1973 
data and post-1974 data suggest a 0.4% annual escalation rate. 
2. Personnel Cost 
Personnel costs are computed as the annualized sum of 
salaries, bonuses and on board allowances. All the costs are 
expressed in constant 1985 year Yen. The annual bonus is 
approximately 5.4 times the monthly salary. The on board 
allowance is approximately 27%-33% of monthly salary in the case 
of surface ships at port, and 48% for submarines and for the 
sailing allowance. Figures 16-19 show trend in personnel costs 
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Figure 16. Personnel Cost/Person Aboard a DD:  1962-1991 
26 Note:    1. Cost/Ton in these chart are expressed in real Yens, based 
on FY1985 prices and using a FY1985 deflator.(1,000 yen). 















Figure 17. Personnel Cost/Person Aboard a DDG:  1971-1991 
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Figure 19.  Personnel Cost/Person Aboard an SS:     1967-1991 
Here again the major shift occurred around the 1973 
Oil Shock. Post-Oil Shock data suggests an annual escalation 
rate of 0.7  %   (see Appendix M). 
3.   Capital  Labor  Ratio 
In this analysis, the capital labor ratio is computed by 
dividing the shipbuilding cost by the ship's complement. Tables 
7-10 and Figures 20-23 show the ratio for each ship type over 
the indicated years.27 
27
 Note: 1.   Total Cost is expressed in real  Yen,   based on FY1985 
prices and using a FY1985 deflator.(1,000 yen). 
2.  Line in graph indicates a trend line. 
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Note: The capital labor ratio of YAMAGUMO(the first KUMO-class) is used 
as the base for normalization. 
Table 7. Change in Capital Labor Ratio for DD Type Destroyers: 
1962-1991 
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Figure 20. Capital Labor Ratio for DD:  1962-1991 
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Note: The capital labor ratio of TACHI-KAZE(the first TACHIKAZE-class) 
is used as the base for normalization. 
Table 8. Change in Capital Labor Ratio for DDG Type Destroyers: 
1960-1992 
Fiscal   Year 
Figure 21. Capital Labor Ratio for DDG:  1960-1992 
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(0.54 11,891 (1.81) 
198,175 
(3.31) 
Note: The capital labor ratio of TIKUGO(the first TIKUGO-class) is used as the 
base for normalization. 
Table 9. Change in Capital Labor Ratio for DE Type Destroyers: 
1967-1991 
Fiscal   Year 
Figure 22. Capital Labor Ratio for DE:  1967-1989 
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Note: The capital labor ratio of UZU-SHIO(the first UZUSHIO-class) 
is used as the base for normalization. 
Table 10. Change in Capital Labor Ratio for SS Type Submarine: 
1967-1993 
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Figure 23. Capital Labor Ratio for SS:  1967-1993 
Comparing the capital labor ratio across ship types shows 
two distinct results: across ship types, there is a distinct 
shift in trend line before and after 1973; and, the capital 
labor ratio changes from ship class to ship class. For example, 
Table 7 and Figure 20 shows that the new Ame Class DD destroyer 
43 
exhibits a significantly higher capital labor ratio than the 
previous destroyer classes, such as the Kiri and the Yuki 
classes. The higher capital labor ratio reflects investment in 
high-technology equipment, such as Vertical Launched ASROC (VLA) 
and Phased Arrey Radar (FAR), to cope with modern warfare. It 
also demonstrates the effort to contain personnel costs by 
replacing labor with capital. Table 10 and Figure 23 illustrate 
the effect of modernization and substitution for submarines. 
C. PERSONNEL ANALYSIS 
1. The Future Recruiting Population 
This section describes demographic trends in the youth 
population that constitutes potential applicants for military 
service. Figure 24 shows the relationship between the number of 
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Relation Between Number of Applicants and 
Recruits:  1981-1990 
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In 1990, the JSDF accepted about 20,000 personnel out of 40,000 
applicants. Since almost all applications for military service 
come from 18-26 year old males, declines in this population 
should reduce the number of future applicants, given the current 
economic conditions and relative compensation levels. 
Figure 25 compares the recruit/applicant ratio and economic 
conditions measured by GNP growth rate, for the period from 1976 
to 1993. The recruit/applicant ratio declines when economic 
conditions turn down. In a recent severe economic downturn, 
produced the lowest recruits/applicants ratio in the last 20 
years. For FY1992 and FY1993, there are four applicants to one 
recruiting position, which is almost double the historic 
average. 
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Figure 25. Trend Relation Between Recruits/Applicants and 
Economic Condition:  1976-1993 
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Table 11 projects an annual decline of 2.3% for the 15-19 
year old male population and 3.6% for females of the same age, 
between 1991 and 2006.28 
(1,00C ) persons) 
MALE FEMALE 
YEAR Age 15-19 20-24 15-24 15-19 20-24 15-24 
1991 940 3,270 4,210 870 3,260 4,130 
1992 914 3,360 4,274 846 3,350 4,196 
1993 888 3,450 4,338 822 3,440 4,262 
1994 862 3,540 4,402 798 3,540 4,338 
1995 836 3,630 4,466 774 3,630 4,404 
1996 810 3,720 4,530 750 3,720 4,470 
1997 786 3,590 4,376 716 3,610 4,326 
1998 762 3,470 4,232 682 3,500 4,182 
1999 738 3,340 4,078 648 3,390 4,038 
2000 714 3,216 3,930 614 3,280 3,894 
2001 690 3,090 3,780 580 3,170 3,750 
2002 680 2,996 3,676 560 3,086 3,646 
2003 670 2,900 3,570 540 3,000 3,540 
2004 660 2,810 3,470 520 2,920 3,440 
2006 640 2,620 3,260 480 2,750 3,230 
Source:National census,"Population Estimate" 
(as of Oct.l of each year) 
"Future Estimate of Japan's Population" 
by Institute of Population Problems, 
Ministry of Health and Welfare. 
Table 11. The Change in Male/Female Population:  1991-2006 
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 Sources : Before 1993 : National census, " Population Estimate" (as 
of Oct. 1 each year) by Statistic Bureau of Management and Coordination 
Agency. After 1994 : "Future Estimate of Japan's Population" by 
Institute of Population Problems, Ministry of Health and Welfare(based 
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Figure 26. Population Projections for 15-24 Year Old Youths 
1991-2006 
Since most recruits come from the 18-19 year old male 
category, the expected decline in this population poses a 
significant future challenge for JMSDF recruiting. Continued 
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increases in female recruits, better pay and improving the 
quality of life of the Self Defense Force may be necessary to 
meet the future requirements. 
2. JMSDF Recruits 
The average ratio of the JMSDF's recruits to applicants was 
5.6% during the past decade. In other words, JMSDF successfully 
enlisted 5.6% of all applicants to the JSDF (see Appendix N). 
This is considerably lower than the average ratio for the total 
Self Defense Force. Figure 27 shows the change in actual JMSDF 
recruits per year. There is a significant year to year 
variation. For example, the 300 FY1992 recruits are only one 
tenth of the recruits in FY1987. Such wide variation could pose 
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Figure 27. JMSDF Recruits: 1984-1993 
Figure 28 vividly illustrates the recent difficulties in 
attracting the necessary JMSDF recruits, even in poor national 
economic conditions. JMSDF obtained fewer than 50% of the 
planned recruits in FY1992 and FY1993. 
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Fiscal Year 
Figure 28. The Ratio of Actual and Planned Recruits:  1984-1993 
3. The Changes in JHSDF Ship's  Complement 
The ratio of a ship's crew to its displacement indicates 
labor-intensity. Figures 28-31 show this ratio for four ship 
types over the years indicated (also see Appendix 0). These 
figures show a downward trend in JMSDF ships' complements per 
displacement ton for each ship type. This decrease coincides 
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E. NATIONAL DEFENSE MANPOWER DEMAND 
1. The Posture of the JMSDF in the NDPO 
The posture of the JMSDF in the National Defense Program 
Outline (NDPO) is reproduced below. 
1. The JMSDF must possess one fleet escort force as a mobile 
operating ship unit in order to quickly respond to enemy aggressive 
action at sea. The fleet escort force must be able to maintain at 
least one escort flotilla on alert at all times. 
2. The JMSDF must possess, as ship units assigned to coastal 
surveillance and defense, surface anti-submarine capability of at 
least one ship division in operational readiness at all times m each 
assigned sea district. 
3. The JMSDF must maintain submarine units, anti-submarine 
helicopter units and mine sweeping units, providing the capability 
for surveillance and defense missions as well as mine sweeping at 
important harbors and major straits when the need arises. 
4. The JMSDF must maintain fixed-wing anti-submarine aircraft 
units in order to provide the capability of carrying out missions of 
surveillance and patrol of nearby seas and ship protection.2 
Descriptions of the actual scales of organization and 
primary equipment included in the foregoing concepts are given 
as attachments.  Required inventories are summarized in Table 7. 
29
 Defense of Japan 1992 (Defense Agency) p247. 
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Basic Units 
Anti-submarine Surface-Ship Units 4 Escort 
(for mobile operation) Flotilla 
Anti-submarine Surface-Ship Units 
(Regional District units) 10  Divisions 
Submarine Units 6  Divisions 
Mine sweeping Units 2  Flotilla 
Land-based Anti-submarine Aircraft 16  Squadrons 
Units 
Main Equipment 
Anti-submarine surface Ships Approx. 60 Ships 
Submarines 16 Submarines 
Combat Aircraft Approx.  220 
Aircraft 
Table 7. JMSDF Inventory Level as Stipulated by NDPO 
2. Estimated Personnel Demand for Ships in NDPO 
The JMSDF inventory includes 60 ships, 16 submarines, and 
30 mine-sweeping crafts. Both ships' crews and aviation crews 
are needed to support this inventory. However, ships' crews 
account for approximately 44% of JMSDF personnel. Thus, trends 
for ships' crews likely represent the general trend for JMSDF 
personnel. Figure 32 shows the estimated demand for ships' crews 
required to maintain about 60 ships. These estimates were 
calculated based on ships' complement. Complements for new ships 
are as follows: "MURASAME" type DD (complement: 170); new type 
SS (complement: 70); MSC (complement: 40); and auxiliary ships 
same as FY1995 level. 
53 
I- 00 o\ 
o o o 
o o o     o 
C>J CS (N        OJ 
Fiscal   Year 
Figure 32. Change in Estimated Demand for Ships' Crew 
As shown in Figure 32, the demand for ships' crews is 
estimated to decline by 0.5% annually. Older ships with larger 
crew sizes are continually replaced by newer ships with smaller 
crew sizes. This will continue through the year 2001. 
However, the question remains as to whether the lower 
demand for ships' crews will be met in light of the rapidly 
decreasing youth population. Earlier, Figure 26 showed that the 
youth population is expected to decline in the next 10 years by 
2.3% for males and 3.6% for females. The larger relative decline 
in the applicant pool means it will be considerably harder for 
the JMSDF to fill future recruit requirements. 
JMSDF must consider new options to fulfill its future 
missions. The options include continued on-board manpower- 
saving measures, increased employment of female and older 
personnel, improvements in quality of life, and increases in 
monetary remuneration.  The feasibility of increasing monetary 
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remuneration to attract more JMSDF recruits is examined in the 
following section. 
3. Improvement in Monetary Remuneration 
One possible solution involves increasing the JSDF's 
monetary remuneration. Salaries for a given age group are based 
on average salaries of their civilian counterparts. One approach 
to increase JSDF recruits is to double their salary. 
In the FY1993 Defense Budget, the personnel and provisions 
expense category includes both salaries and provisions. The 
provisions cost was 1,940 trillion yen (see Appendix P). Since 
the ratio of personnel to provisions is about 98%, the cost of 
personnel salaries was 1,901 trillion yen. If this value is 
doubled, the personnel expense becomes 3,802 trillion yen. 
Adding this value to the provision expense yields 6,541 trillion 
yen as the total Defense Budget. Japan had a 495,300 trillion 
yen GNP in 1993.30 Thus, the ratio of defense expenditures to 
GNP would be 1.3%. This is approximately 0.3% higher after 
doubling salaries. 
Table 12 shows the ratio of defense expenditures to GNP for 
other countries. In comparison with these countries, Japan's 
defense burden with the higher salaries does not seem 
unreasonable. 















1 UNITED STATES 242,717 964 5.3 
2 RUSSIA 39,680 268 9.9 
3 CHINA 22,364 19 5 
4 FRANCE 21,898 385 3.4 
5 UNITED KINGDOM 20,726 366 4 
6 GERMANY 19,252 251 2.4 
7 JAPAN 16,901 136 1 
8 SAUDI ARABIA 14,535 1,371 11.8 
9 ITALY 10,690 186 2 
10 KUWAIT 10,185 5,000 62.4 
11 CANADA 7,790 288 2 
12 INDIA 7,550 9 2.5 
13 SOUTH KOREA 7,189 160 3.8 
14 TAIWAN 5,373 253 4.8 
15 NORTH KOREA 5,087 214 25.7 
16 AUSTRALIA 4,335 254 2.4 
17 CROATIA 4,330 913 24.1 
18 UKRAINE 4,320 82 3.8 
19 U.A.E 4,249 2,418 14.6 
20 ISRAEL 3,984 783 11.1 
source: The Military Balance 1993-1994 
Table 12.   Defense Expenditures and Defense Burdens  for 
High-Ranking Countries   (1992) 
F.    AN   ALTERNATIVE   FLEET   CONFIGURATION 
1. Review of the Current Fleet Configuration 
In accordance with the policy directive that NDPO adopted 
in October 1976, JMSDF has about 160 ships, including 62 
destroyers, 16 submarines, 36 mine sweepers, and other service 
forces or auxiliary ships (see Figure 33). As shown in Figure 
34, 59% of the total ship personnel is assigned to Destroyers. 
In addition, destroyers can be divided into four categories, 
based upon their missions (i.e., Anti-Submarine ships, Anti-Air 
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ships, Anti-Surface ships, and Multi-Purpose ships). Figure 35 
shows the distribution of destroyers across missions. 

















The Distribution of JMSDF Destroyers Across Missions 
Note that half of all JMSDF Destroyers are designed for 
anti-submarine warfare. Such predominance of anti-submarine 
warfare in JMSDF reflects the joint Japanese/U.S. strategy to 
counter Soviet submarine threats during the Cold War. However, 
the possibility of full-scale attack on the sea-lanes by Soviet 
submarines has declined. Consequently, the number of these ships 
could be reduced. In fact, many experts call for a more balanced 
Japanese defense capability.31 It is important to conduct a 
thorough review of Japanese defense capabilities. Such a review 
should cover a broad range of Japan's defense-related matters, 
including organization, formations and deployment of the SDF, 
human and fiscal constraints, and the latest technological 
trends. The following will consider a possible alternative fleet 
31
 The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan 
(Advisory Group on Defense Issues) p22. 
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configuration and examine its feasibility in terms of costs and 
manpower requirements. 
2. Fleet Configurations in Other Countries 
Before considering a new fleet configuration for JMSDF, it 
may help to examine the fleet configuration of other countries. 
Their assets are categorized into aircraft carriers (CV), 
ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), other submarines (SS), 
cruisers (CC), destroyers (DD), frigates (FF), mine warfare 
ships (M/W), amphibious warfare ships (A/W), and auxiliary 
ships. Figures 36 through 39 show fleet configurations for the 
U.S., Russia, France, the U.K., Russia Pacific, China, South 
Korea, North Korea and Japan. Configurations are expressed in 
numbers of ships and full ton displacement (in natural 
logarithmic scale) (see Appendix Q). Figure 38 visually 
illustrates how the U.S, Russia, U.K, and France have well- 
balanced fleet configurations. In contrast to these countries, 
JMSDF lacks the strategic capability and ability to defend any 
area beyond JASDF's fighter coverage range. 
a. Comparison  of Aircraft Assets  Comparison 
Across  Countries 
Figure 40 compares the naval aircraft assets of the 
previously listed countries. They are categorized into bomber 
(BBR), fighter (FTR), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), maritime 
reconnaissance (MR), electric warfare (EW), airborne early 
warning (AEW), commando (CDO), and mine countermeasure (MCM) 
aircraft. Figure 40 again illustrates that the ASW mission 
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U.S. Pacific U.S. Pacific (in Japan) 
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Figure 40. Aircraft Asset Comparison by Number of Aircraft: 
Asia-Pacific Theater  (Number of Aircraft in Natural Log.) 
3.   An Alternative  JMSDF Fleet   Configuration 
An alternative JMSDF fleet configuration for the Post-Cold 
War period is summarized in Table 13. Table 14 provides a more 
detailed description of ship assets and personnel requirements 
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based on the new configuration. The personnel complement was 
calculated based on the ratio of crew/displacement ton 
calculated earlier. The number of DDV and DDH, DDG, DD is 
consistent with a basic escort flotilla (1 DDV, 1 DDH, 2 DDG, 8 
DD and 2 AOE). Table 15 shows the associated aircraft 
configuration. Figure 41 contrasts the old and new fleet 
configurations in terms of displacement tons (expressed in 
natural logarithms). The new configuration provides an enhanced 
anti-aircraft capability. 
Basic Units 
Multi-Purpose Surface-Ship Units 2 Escort Flotilla 
(for mobile operation) 
Multi-purpose Surface-Ship Units 10  Divisions 
(Regional District units) 6  Divisions 
Submarine Units 2  Flotilla 
Mine sweeping Units 16  Squadrons 
Land-based Anti-submarine Aircraft 
Units 
Main Equipment 
Anti-submarine surface Ships Approx. 45  Ships 
Submarines 16  Submarines 
Combat Aircraft Approx. 190 Aircraft 
Table 13. Alternative Fleet Configuration 
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TYPE NUMBER STD. TRON COMPLEMENT 
SUBMARINE SS 16 2,500 70 
CARRIER DDV 2 15,000 450 
DESTROYER DDH 2 5,000 200 
DDG 4 7,000 280 
DD 38 4,500 180 
MINE 
SWEEPER 
MST 4 4,000 240 
MSO 6 1,500 90 
MSC 45 550 30 
AMPHIBIOUS LST 2 9,000 360 
LST 6 3,500 210 
AUXILIARY AOE 4 10,000 200 
ASR 2 3,500 100 
ATSS 2 2,500 70 
ATS 2 3,000 90 
AOS 4 3,000 30 
AGS 4 3,000 120 
ARC 2 5,000 150 
ASE 2 3,000 90 
AGB 1 10,000 150 
TV 3 4,000 160 
Table 14. Ship Configuration for New NDPO 
TYPE NUMBER CREW 
FTR VFA 40 1 
ASW VP 80 10 
SH 48 3 
EW EP 6 10 







VC 8 4 
US 7 10 
UH 21 3 
UP 4 5 
- 80 2 
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Figure 41. Current and New NDPO Fleet Configuration by 
Displacement, Full Tons  (in Natural Log) 
4. Manpower Requirement of New Fleet Configuration 
a. Ship  Crew Requirement 
Table 16 estimates the total crew requirements by ship 
type and total number of ships. As discussed earlier, these 
estimates are based on current data and the historic manpower 
substitution rates. 
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TYPE      NUMBER COMPLEMENT Total Crew 
SUBMARINE SS 16 70 1,120 
CARRIER DDV 2 450 900 
DESTROYER DDH 2 200 400 
DDG 4 280 1,120 
DD 38 180 6,840 
MINE 
SWEEPER 
MST 4 240 960 
MSO 6 90 540 
MSC 45 30 1,350 
AMPHIBIOUS LST 2 360 720 
LST 6 210 1,260 
AUXILIARY AOE 4 200 800 
ASR 2 100 200 
ATSS 2 70 140 
ATS 2 90 180 
AOS 4 30 120 
AGS 4 120 480 
ARC 2 150 300 
ASE 2 90 180 
AGB 1 150 150 
TV 3 160 480 
OTHERS 500 
TOTAL 151 3,270 18,740 
Table 16. Estimated Ship Crew Requirements 
b.   Flight  Crew and Maintenance  Personnel 
Requirement 
Table 17 estimates the flight crew requirement. Table 
18 shows the estimated requirement for aviation maintenance. 
Both estimates are based on the current personnel levels. 
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TYPE NUMBER CREW COEFFI. TOTAL 
FTR VFA 40 1 2.0 80 
ASW VP 80 10 1.5 1,200 
SH 48 3 2.0 288 
EW EP 6 10 1.5 90 







VC 8 4 1.2 38 
US 7 10 1.5 105 
UH 21 3 2.0 126 
UP 4 5 1.5 30 
- 80 2 1.5 240 
TOTAL 306 55 2,365 
Table 17.    Estimated Flight Crew Requirement 
TYPE NUMBER COEFFI. TOTAL 
FTR VFA 40 15.0 600 
ASW VP 80 20.0 1,600 
SH 48 14.0 672 
EW EP 6 20.0 120 







VC 8 20.0 160 
US 7 20.0 140 
UH 21 14.0 294 
UP 4 20.0 80 
- 80 5.0 400 
TOTAL 306 162 4,234 
Table 18.    Estimated Aviation Maintenance Personnel 
Requirement 
c.   Total   Estimated Manpower Requirement   for New 
Fleet   Configuration 
Table 19 shows the total estimated manpower for the 
new fleet configuration. "ON SHORE", "COMMON", and "RESERVE" 
personnel requirements are based on current staffing levels. 
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TYPE MANPOWER 
SHIP'S CREW 18,740 
AVIATION 6,599 




Table 19. Total Estimated Man Power 
Requirement for New Fleet Configuration 
The alternative fleet configuration requires 40,339 
personnel, which is a 12.5% reduction from the current manpower 
level (the FY1994 JMSDF personnel level is 46,085). This 
suggests that the alternative fleet configuration has a more 
viable manpower requirement than the existing configuration. 
However, this reduction alone may not be sufficient to solve the 
future staffing problem. 
5. Comparative Cost Estimate of the Current and New 
Fleet Configurations 
This section compares the costs for the current and new 
alternative NDPO configurations. Total costs are estimated for 
each configuration during the period from FY 2005 to FY 2015. 
a. Cost  Estimate of Ship Assets 
Table 20 estimates the ship asset cost for the current 
NDPO configuration from FY2005 to FY2015. Table 21 estimates the 
ship asset cost for the new NDPO configuration. Calculations for 
these tables are provided in Appendices R and S. Comparing 
Tables 20 and 21 shows that the new NDPO configuration reduces 
ship asset costs by 1.172 trillion yen, or 31.8%. 
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SS 16 11 11 73,778,657 811,565,227 
DDH 4 3 3 111,677,445 335,032,335 
DDG 8 3 3 234,534,151 703,602,453 
DD 30 9 9 108,149,242 973,343,178 
DD(DE) 20 7 7 81,054,702 567,382,914 
MST 4 0 0 - - 
MSO 3 3 3 46,735,466 140,206,398 
MSC 33 18 18 9,805,065 176,491,170 
LST 1 0 0 - - 
LST 6 4 4 19,040,702 76,162,808 
AOE 4 1 1 30,217,951 30,217,951 
ASR 2 1 1 3,343,452 3,343,452 
ATS 2 0 0 - - 
ADS 2 0 0 - - 
AGS 4 2 2 17,461,435 34,922,870 
ARC 1 1 1 43,585,981 43,585,981 
ASE 2 1 1 51,693,799 51,693,799 
AGB 1 1 1 - - 
TV 3 0 0 - - 
TOTAL 146 65 65 831,078,048 3,947,550,536 
NOTE: A6B is built by the budget of Education Department. 
Table 20. Estimated Cost of Ship Assets: Current NDPO 
Configuration 
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(Unit:Constant  1, 000 Yen in 1985 year yen) 










SS 16 16 11 11 73,778,657 811,565,227 
DDV 2 0 0 2 242,469,243 484,938,486 
DDH 2 4 3 1 111,677,445 111,677,445 
DDG 4 8 3 -1 234,534,151 - 
DD 38 50 16 4 108,149,242 432,596,968 
MST 4 4 0 0 - - 
MSO 6 3 3 6 46,735,466 280,412,796 
MSC 45 33 18 30 9,805,065 294,151,950 
LST 6 1 0 5 45,492,825 227,464,125 
LST 4 6 4 2 19,040,702 38,081,404 
AOE 2 4 1 -1 - - 
ASR 2 2 1 1 3,343,452 3,343,452 
ATS 2 2 0 0 - - 
AOS 4 2 0 2 - - 
ASS 4 4 2 2 17,461,435 34,922,870 
ARC 2 1 1 2 43,585,981 87,171,962 
ASE 2 2 1 1 51,693,799 51,693,799 
AGB 1 1 1 1 - - 
TV 3 3 0 0 - - 
|    TOTAL 149 146 65 68 1,007,767,463 2,858,020,484 
NOTE: AGB is built by the budget of Education Department 
Table 21. Estimated Cost of Ship Assets: New NDPO Configuration 
b.    Cost    Estimate   of  Aircraft   Assets 
Table 22 estimates the cost of aircraft assets for the 
current NDPO level from FY2005 to FY2015. Table 23 estimates the 
cost of aircraft assets for the new NDPO configuration from 
FY2005 to FY2015. The calculations in these tables are provided 
Appendices T and U. Comparing Tables 22 and 23, the new NDPO 
configuration increases estimated aircraft costs by 32 billion 
yen, or 1.1%. 
72 










VP 80 80 80 24,939,277 1,995,142,160 
SH 100 64 64 10,362,632 663,208,448 
EP 5 2 2 25,828,731 51,657,462 
MH 11 11 11 13,415,135 147,566,485 
VC 4 0 0 - - 
OS 7 7 7 15,474,666 108,322,662 
UH 21 12 12 7,884,388 94,612,656 
UP 2 1 1 30,528,119 30,528,119 
TRG. etc 80 55 55 68418916 
TOTAL 310 232 232 128,432,948 3,091,037,992 
Table 22. Estimated Cost of Aircraft Assets: Current NDPO 
Configuration 














VFA 40 0 0 40 10,070,249 402,809,960 
VP 80 80 80 80 24,939,277 1,995,142,160 
SE 48 100 64 12 10,362,632 124,351,584 
EP 6 5 2 3 25,828,731 77,486,193 
MH 12 11 11 12 13,415,135 160,981,620 
VC 8 4 0 4 - - 
US 7 7 7 7 15,474,666 108,322,662 
UH 21 21 12 12 7,884,388 94,612,656 
UP 4 2 1 3 30,528,119 91,584,357 
TRG. etc 80 80 55 55 68,418,916 
TOTAL 306 310 232 228 138,503,197 3,123,710,108 




6. Cost Comparison Expressed in JMSDF Budgetary 
Format 
a. Personnel   and Provisions   Category 
Table 24 estimates the cost of Personnel and 
Provisions for the current NDPO configuration from FY2005 to 
FY2015. Table 25 shows the same results for the new NDPO 
configuration. These calculations use the estimated number of 
JMSDF personnel for FY2010, calculated as described earlier. 








Expense 2005 - 
2015 
1993 2010 
329,059,411 7,791 13,091 46,085 638,092,910 6,380,929,100 
Note: Escalation Rate is 0.031, average from 1985 to 1993 
Table 24. Estimated Personnel & Provisions Cost: 
Con f igurat ion 
Current NDPO 








Expense 2005 - 
2015 
1993 2010 
329,059,411 7,791 13,091 40,339 528,077,561 5,280,775,615 
Note: Escalation Rate is 0.031, average from 1985 to 1993 
Table 25. Estimated Personnel & Provisions Cost: New NDPO 
Con f igurat ion 
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b.   Front-Line  Costs 
Front-line costs in the JMSDF budget include three 
costs: ship assets, aircraft assets, and ammunition. Each cost 
for the current NDPO configuration is estimated as  follows: 
• Ship Assets:   3,684,784,233   (1,000 Yen)   -Table 20 
• Aircraft Assets:   3,065,019,522   (1,000 Yen)   -Table 22 
• Ammunition:  see Table 26 below 










Note: Escalation Rate is 0.092, average from 1985 to 1993 
Table 26. Ammunition Expenses for 
the Current Configuration 
Ammunition costs are assumed to escalate 9.2% annually from 
their current level. Ammunition costs are assumed to be the 
same for both the current and new NDPO configurations. 
Each cost item for the new NDPO configuration is 
estimated as follows: 
• Ship Assets: 2,512,110,752 (1,000 Yen) -Table 21 
• Aircraft Assets: 3,097,381,270 (1,000 Yen) -Table 23 
• Ammunition: 1,834,850,298 (1,000 Yen) -Table 26 
c. Others  Costs 
These costs were calculated according to the 
methodology used to estimate ammunition costs, except the 
escalation rate is 7.1% annually. These costs are the same for 
both configurations (see Table 27). 
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Note: Escalation Rate is 0.071, average from 1985 to 1993 
Table 27. Other Expense (2005-2015) 
7.  Comparison Costs for the Current and New NDPO 
Configurations 
Table 28 compares the cost of the current and the new NDPO 
fleet configurations in the JMSDF annualized budgetary format. 
The new NDPO fleet configuration saves 687 billion yen annually; 
a 2.8% cost reduction. 
(Unit:Constant 1,000 Yen in 1985 year Yen) 
Ctegory NDPO level New NDPO level 
ship Assets 3,947,550,536 2,858,020,484 
Aircraft assets 3,091,037,992 3,123,710,108 
Personnel & Provisions 6,380,929,100 5,280,775,615 
Ammunitions 183,485,030 1,834,850,298 
Others 10,644,067,853 10,644,067,853 
Total 24,247,070,511 23,741,424,358 
Table 28. Comparison of Current NDPO with an 
Alternative Fleet Configuration 
76 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Japan may be at an important turning point similar to what 
the country experienced fifty years ago. 
Since the World War II, Japan has been reconstructing its 
economic infrastructure under a military umbrella provided by 
the United States. Japan succeeded in developing into a major 
economic power without serious public discussion about defense 
policy. This domestic condition is represented in the phrase 
"Water and safety are FREE," which became popular in Japan 
during this period. However, this course of action was supported 
only during the Cold War when the U.S. and Japan were confronted 
by common threat, communism. 
When the Cold War ended in 1989, the U.S. and Soviet Union 
began reducing their military power in the Asia-Pacific region. 
With the end of Cold War, however, China's powerful presence has 
been increasingly felt by her Asian neighbors. The Spratly 
Islands episode provided a glimpse of what the future might hold 
for China's neighbors. It left an indelible mark on the future 
direction of Asian-Pacific security. 
In Japan, members of the Advisory Group on Defense Issues 
agree that Japan's place in the world is changing. They state 
that isolationism and defense spending cuts in are not in line 
with the global political reality. 
This background motivated the primary research question, 
"What changes should JMSDF make to meet the challenges of the 
post-Cold War era?" 
To answer this question, the thesis reviewed Japan's 
defense capability, and those of other Asia-Pacific countries. 
Although annual Japanese defense expenditures are now ranked 7th 
in the world, the Japanese defense force is not well-structured 
for the post-Cold War environment. A hypothetical alternative 
fleet configuration was constructed to determine its feasibility 
77 
in terms of costs and manpower requirements. The alternative 
configuration is found to be both cheaper and require less 
manpower. 
However, adopting an alternative configuration requires a 
significant change in attitude toward national security amongst 
the Japanese population. Only frank and in-depth discussions 
concerning basic defense policy among the Japanese people and 
politicians determine the shape of the new fleet configuration. 
Furthermore, such discussions should be couched in a larger 







BASIC POLICY FOR JAPAN'S NATIONAL DEFENSE 
The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and 
indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such action, 
thereby preserving the independence and peace of Japan founded 
upon democratic principles. 
To achieve this objective, the government of Japan hereby 
establishes the following principles: 
1. To support the actives of the united Nations and promote 
international cooperation, thereby contributing to the 
realization of world peace. 
2. To promote public welfare and enhance the people's love 
for the country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential 
to Japan's security. 
3 . To develop progressively the effective defense 
capabilities necessary for self-defense, with regard to the 
nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation. 
4. To deal with external aggression on the basis of the 
Japan-U.S. security arrangements, pending the effective 
functioning of the United States in the future in deterring and 
repelling such aggression. 
source : Defense of Japan (defense Agency, Japan) 
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APPENDIX  B. 
TREND  OF   NAVAL  FORCES   (FULL  TON)(U.S.   PACIFIC) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 




SSN 195,237 211,084 202,164 206,731 209,358 205,058 175,018 
SS 8,176 8,176 8,176 8,176 8,176 
CARRIER 491,237 582,724 582,244 582,244 582,224 593,274 
BATTLE SHIP 57,353 57,353 57,353 114,706 114,706 114,706 57,353 
CRUSER 167,427 168,425 197,195 197,195 233,176 224,855 234,321 
DESTROYER 197,648 197,648 197,648 197,648 197,648 187,998 173,523 
FRIGATE 159,325 156,309 160,186 152,671 129,998 122,084 111,680 
HINE WAREFARE FORCE 2,624 3,936 
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE 512,620 516,196 516,196 531,922 531,922 535,498 542,774 
TOTAL 1,410,286 1,956,428 2,071,642 2,141,293 2,157,228 2,12S,047 2,041,879 
1992 1993 1994 




SSN 168,385 183,562 183,562 
SS 
CARRIER 609,156 528,513 533,412 
BATTLE SHIP 
CRUSER 253,194 262,660 162,335 
DESTROYER 144,573 139,748 165,014 
FRIGATE 99,666 52,376 52,376 
MINE WAREFARE FORCE 3,936 2,092 
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE 560,191 521,191 474,235 
TOTAL 1,989,101 1,840,142 1,720,934 
Note 1.     MIME WAREFARE FORCE count LSMs  and above. 
:   2.     Amphibious Force count LSMs  and above. 
Source   :   JANE'S     FIGHTING     SHIP     1985-1986 1994-1995 
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APPENDIX   C. 
TREND  OF  NAVAL  FORCES(FULL  TON)(RUSSIA) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
SSBH 820,600 850,700 825,050 740,850 734,550 766,250 740,600 
SSB 44,250 44,250 44,250 41,300 35,400 
SSGN 302,150 314,650 327,150 322,150 337,650 345,350 301,550 
SSG 64,600 61,600 61,600 61,600 61,600 61,600 57,750 
SSN 390,200 408,500 399,300 479,200 504,900 487,400 403,900 
SS 330,430 339,010 318,861 292,411 286,287 281,790 249,892 
CASHIER 162,000 162,000 162,000 162,000 162,000 229,500 229,500 
BATTLE SHIP 
CRUSER 502,000 502,000 513,200 524,400 514,300 393,900 329,OSO 
DESTROYER 324,520 336,330 333,380 312,780 313,770 307,270 266,250 
FRIGATE 329,170 332,150 324,270 323,340 321,310 310,570 299,120 
MINE «AREFARE FORCE 130,175 132,725 132,725 130,675 128,495 122,739 115,279 
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE 201,292 217,612 221,692 222,652 226,732 239,332 241,790 
TOTAL 3,601,387 3,701,S27 3,663,478 3,613,3S8 3,626,994 3,545,701 3,234,681 
1992 1993 1994 
SSBN 731,150 683,150 624,200 
SSB 
SSGH 287,650 251,600 215,000 
SSG 46,200 26,950 19,250 
SSN 433,400 436,300 374,500 
SS 225,844 207,246 198,548 
CARRIER 229,500 189,000 112,000 
BATTLE SHIP 
CRUSER 313,650 267,050 186,750 
DESTROYER 266,450 259,500 243,774 
FRIGATE 289,620 278,120 263,900 
HIKE HAREFÄRE FORCE 102,137 99,247 92,879 
AHPHIBIOUS FORCE 240,954 235,634 233,234 
TOTAL 3,166,555 2,933,797 2,564,035 
Note : 1.  MINE WAREFAKE FORCE count LSMs and above. 
: 2.  Amphibious Force count LSMs and above. 
Source : JANE'S FIGHTING SHIP 1985-1986 - 1994-1995 
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APPENDIX   D. 
TREND  OF  NAVAL  FORCES(FULL  TON)(CHINA) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
SSBH 16,000 16,000 32,000 8,000 8,000 8,000 8,000 
SSB 2,950 2,950 2,950 2,950 2,950 
SSGN 
SSG 1,700 1,700 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 
SSN IS,000 15,000 15,000 10,000 10,000 20,000 20,000 




DESTROYER 63,210 61,170 61,170 62,800 59,540 63,210 55,0S0 
FRIGATE 52,268 54,088 62,412 60,488 57,728 70,780 68,184 
MINE WAREFARE FORCE 14,160 16,520 56,840 54,480 58,730 62,600 62,600 
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE 115,708 130,478 137,968 153,808 149,658 157,658 160,438 
TOTAL 464,682 491,025 550,749 441,322 437,515 479,496 473,633 
1992 1993 1994 
SSBH 8,000 8,000 8,000 
SSB 
SSGN 
SSG 2,100 2,100 2,100 
SSN 25,000 25,000 25,000 




DESTROYER 62,390 58,720 66,590 
FRIGATE 70,760 70,180 68,426 
MINE HAREFARE FORCE 63,220 30,043 30,353 
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE 152,278 126,000 13S,080 
TOTAL 475,802 396,790 407,353 
Note : 1.  MINE WAREFARE FORCE count LSMs and above. 
: 2.  Amphibious Force count LSMs and above. 
Source : JANE'S  FIGHTING  SHIP  1985-1986 1994-1995 
87 
88 
APPENDIX  E. 
TREND  OF MILITARY  FORCES   IN ASIAN-PACIFIC  AREA 
Coa&try Foroe 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
u.a. 
Seventh Fleet 
Total Number 70 70 70 70 70 70 60 60 60 60 
Total Ton(ailion) 70 70 70 70 70 70 65 65 65 65 
Air Craft 230 230 230 230 230 200 130 140 140 140 
IB Korea 
Divisions 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total Nuaber(ailion) 3 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3 2.6 2.6 
Air Craft 100 100 100 100 100 110 90 ,90 80 80 
Ja Japan 
Divisions 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total Hunberladlion) 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.6 




Divisions 41 41 43 43 43 41 38 36 33 27 
Total Number(oalion) 37 27 39 39 39 36 34 32 29 24 
Total  Kuaber S35 840 840 845 840 830 820 780 760 745 
Total Ton(ailion) 178 185 185 190 190 194 212 207 192 189 
Air Fora« 
Cnbat  Aircraft 2,200 2,390 2,390 2,430 2,430 2,240 2,060 1,860 1,430 1,220 
China 
Ground Foroe 
Divis ions 135 135 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 100 
Total  Number(milion) 316 297 211 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 
Naval  Vessel» 
Total  Number 1740 1730 1870 2000 1980 2060 2010 1910 1060 1080 
Total Ton(milion) 91.4 87.7 98.3 94.6 94.5 100 98 98 91 95 
Air Foroe 




Divisions 22 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 22 22 
Total Nunber(ndlionJ 54 52 52 54.2 54.2 55 55 55 55 55 
Maral Vessels 
Total  Number 140 150 160 160 170 180 180 180 220 230 
Total  Ton(milion) 9.9 9 11 10.4 11.3 11.4 11.6 11 12.8 14 
Marine  (milion] 2 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Air Foroe 




Divisions 39 33 33 32 26 31 25 25 30 26 
Total Nunber(milion) 70 75 75 75 75 93 93 93 100 113 
Naval  Vessels 
Total Nuaber 500 510 520 510 520 590 590 620 620 620 
Total Ton(milion) 6.8 7 7.2 6.6 7.1 7.4 7.3 8.1 8.8 8.5 
Air Foroe 
Cnbat Aircraft 740 700 750 740 770 770 790 800 810 810 
Note  i     1    Data avairable from  "Military Balance'etc. 
2    Combat  aircraft  include navy and sarine corps aircraft. 
Source   :     Defense of Japan  1985-1994   (Japan Defense Agency) 
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APPENDIX   F. 
TREND  OF  NAVAL  FORCES(FULL  TON)(SOUTH  KOREA) 











DESTROYER 37,030 37,030 37,030 30,930 30,930 30,930 30,930 30,900 
FRIGATE 12,880 12,880 19,420 12,980 15,260 15,260 15,260 15,260 
tarn: VAREFARE FORCE 3,480 3,480 4,520 5,040 3,480 
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE 40,305 40,305 40,305 36,225 36,225 
TOTAL 50,08S 50,085 56,625 88,220 90,500 91.S40 88,505 87,090 
COLVETTES 14,820 13,680 28,740 30,640 30,640 30,640 
1.  MINE WAREFARE FORCE count LSM3 and above. 
: 2.  Amphibious Force count LSMs and above. 







ss 1,285 2,570 




DESTROYER 30,390 27,610 
FRIGATE 20,100 20,100 
MINE WAREFARE FORCE 4,520 6,130 
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE 37,320 41,250 
TOTAL 94,315 98,849 
COLVETTES 30,640 32,364 
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APPENDIX   G. 
TREND  OF  NAVAL  FORCES(FULL  TON)(NORTH  KOREA) 






SS 32,850 32,850 32,850 34,680 36,510 38,340 38,340 





FRIGATE 3,000 6,000 3,000 3,000 4,845 4,845 4,845 
MINE WAREFARE FORCE 1,500 1,740 1,740 1,740 
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE 
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE 580 870 1,160 870 870 4,495 4,495 
TOTAL 36,430 39,720 37,010 40,050 43,965 53,020 53,650 






SS 42,000 45,750 38,430 





FRIGATE 4,845 4,845 4,845 
MINE WAREFARE FORCE 1,740 1,740 1,740 
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE 
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE 4,495 4.49S 4,495 
TOTAL 57,400 61,150 54,910 
Note : 1.  MINE WAREFARE FORCE count LSMs and above. 
: 2.  Amphibious Force count LSMs and above. 
Source : JANE'S FIGHTING SHIP  1985-1986 1994-1995 
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APPENDIX  H. 
CHANGE   IN  DEFENSE EXPENDITURES 
{Unit:100 million TEN %) 
FY 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
Defence 
(DE) 1,485 1,560 1,569 1,803 2,085 2,412 2,751 3,014 
GNP 102,470 107,620 127,480 156,200 176,700 203,900 240,700 281,600 
BUDGET 13,121 14,192 15,697 19,528 24,268 ,    28,500 32,554 36,581 
Ratio(%) r — 
(1)DE/GNP 1.45% 1.45% 1.23% 1.15% 1.18% 1.18% 1.14% 1.07% 
(2)DE/BUGET 
11.32« 10.99% 10.00% 9.23% 8.59% 8.46% 8.45% 8.24% 
FY 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Defence 
(DE) 3,407 3,809 4,221 4,838 5,695 6,709 8,002 9,355 
GNP 308,500 409,500 478,400 578,600 724,400 843,200 905,500 1,098,000 
BUDGET 43,143 49,509 58,185 67,395 79,497 94,143 114,677 142,841 
Ratio(%) 
(1JDE/GNP 1.10% 0.93% 0.88% 0.84% 0.79% 0.80% 0.88% 0.85% 
(2)DE/BUGET 
7.90% 7.69% 7.25% 7.18% 7.16% 7.13% 6.98% 6.55% 
FY 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Defence 
(DE) 10,930 13,273 15,124 16,906 19,010 20,945 22,302 24,000 
GNP 1,315,000 1,585,000 1,681,000 1,928,500 2,106,000 2,320,000 2,478,000 2,648,000 
BUDGET 170,994 212,888 242,960 285,143 342,950 386,001 425,888 467,881 
Ratio(%) 
(1)DE/GNP 0.83% 0.84% 0.90% 0.88% 0.90% 0.90% 0.90% 0.91% 
(2)DE/BUGET 
6.39% 6.23% 6.22% 5.93% 5.54% 5.43% 5.24% 5.13% 
FY 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Defence 
(DE) 25,861 27,542 29,346 31,371 33,435 35,174 37,003 39,198 
GNP 2,772,000 2,817,000 2,960,000 3,146,000 3,367,000 3,504,000 3,652,000 3,897,000 
BUDGET 496,808 503,796 506,272 524,996 540,886 541,010 566,997 604,142 
Ratio(%) 
(1JDE/GNP 0.93% 0.98% 0.99% 0.997% 0.993% 1.004% 1.013% 1.006% 
(2)DE/BUGET 
5.21% 5.47% 5.80% 5.98% 6.18% 6.50% 6.53% 6.49% 
FY 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Defence 
(DE) 41,593 43,860 45,518 46,406 46,835 
GNP 4,172,000 4,596,000 4,837,000 4,953,000 4,940,000 
BUDGET 662,368 703,474 722,180 723,548 730,817 
Ratio(%) 
(1JDE/GNP 0.997% 0.954% 0.941% 0.937% 0.948% 
(2)DE/BUGET 
6.28% 6.23% 6.30% 6.41% 6.41% 
Source: BOUEI HANDBOOK (Asagumo Shinbunaya) 
note: 1. BUDGET is shown by Original Budget. 
2. GNP i3 Shown by Initial forecasted GNP. 
3. Defense Expenditure and Budget of FY1994 are Gevernment Plan 
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APPENDIX   I. 
CHANGE   IN  JAPAN'S  MAJOR  GENERAL  ACCOUNT  EXPENDITURE(ORIGINAL  BUDGET) 
Fiscal 
Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Social 
Welfare 21,154 28,919 39,282 48,076 56,919 67,811 76,266 
Education 
& Science 15,708 19,633 26,401 30,292 34,301 38,516 42,997 
Defense 9,355 10,930 13,273 15,124 16,906 19,010 20,945 
public 
Works 28,408 28,407 29,095 35,272 42,810 54,501 65,401 
Others 68,221 83,105 104,837 114,196 134,207 163,112 180,392 
Total 142,846 170,994 212,888 242,960 285,143 342,950 386,001 
Fiscal 
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Social 
Welfare 82,124 88,369 90,848 91,398 93,210 95,736 98,346 
Education 
& Science 45,250 47,420 48,637 48,186 48,665 48,409 48,445 
Defense 22,302 24,000 25,861 27,542 29,346 31,371 33,435 
public 
Works 66,554 66,554 66,554 66,554 65,200 63,689 62,233 
Others 209,659 241,537 264,906 270,116 269,849 285,792 298,426 
Total 425,889 467,880 496,806 503,796 506,270 524,997 540,885 
Fiscal 
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Social 
Welfare 100,896 103,845 108,947 116,148 122,132 127,378 131,457 
Education 
& Science 48,497 48,581 49,371 51,129 53,944 56,834 58,205 
Defense 35,174 37,003 39,198 41,593 43,860 45,518 46,406 
public 
Works 60,824 60,824 61,974 62,147 65,897 69,409 73,354 
Others 295,618 316,744 344,653 391,350 417,641 423,041 414,126 












Source   :   Kaijoujieitai Yosan Jomuteiyou   (kaijoubakuryoukanbu) 
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APPENDIX  J. 
TREND   IN  JAPAN'S  DEFENSE  EXPENDITURES(BY  ORGANIZATION) 
FISCAL YEAR 1974 1975 1976 1977 
JGSDF BUDGET 436,063,610 556,630,000 651,653,279 714,429,431 
JMSDF BUDGET 238,992,567 268,047,521 314,051,000 357,156,190 
JASDF BUDGET 279,999,635 335,587,135 362,179,754 413,594,535 
OTHRS BUDGET 137,968,083 167,057,216 184,466,563 205,433,169 
TOTAL 1,093,023,895 1,327,321,872 1,512,350,596 1,690,613,325 
FISCAL YEAR 1978 1979 1980 1981 
JGSDF BUDGET 799,065,903 859,871,056 887,274,653 944,307,702 
JMSDF BUDGET 421,108,858 454,003,847 509,657,110 553,162,912 
JASDF BUDGET 437,841,542 482,653,097 514,435,291 564,635,120 
OTHRS BUDGET 243,013,290 297,961,291 318,835,424 337,913,175 
TOTAL 1,901,029,593 2,094,489,291 2,230,202,478 2,400,018,909 
FISCAL YEAR 1982 1983 1984 1985 
JGSDF BUDGET 986,020,584 1,027,337,475 1,077,538,962 1,161,200,110 
JMSDF BUDGET 602,902,259 654,037,117 705,983,574 733,266,575 
JASDF BUDGET 633,668,319 699,426,640 758,720,730 827,518,662 
OTHRS BUDGET 363,544,309 373,433,151 392,401,518 415,162,801 
TOTAL 2,586,135,471 2,754,234,383 2,934,644,784 3,137,148,148 
FISCAL YEAR 1986 1987 1988 1989 
JGSDF BUDGET 1,249,516,952 1,286,199,804 1,330,266,311 1,379,272,640 
JMSDF BUDGET 793,286,424 861,548,204 940,748,823 971,559,836 
JASDF BUDGET 870,559,587 898,284,910 934,169,264 1,030,049,496 
OTHRS BUDGET 430,186,107 471,400,863 495,143,542 537,952,323 
TOTAL 3,343,549,070 3,517,433,781 3,700,327,940 3,918,834,295 
FISCAL YEAR 1990 1991 1992 1993 
JGSDF BUDGET 1,474,852,513 1,563,154,276 1,633,400,000 1,667,540,000 
JMSDF BUDGET 976,022,583 1,085,383,204 1,100,200,000 1,084,906,000 
JASDF BUDGET 1,121,705,999 1,118,218,270 1,153,200,000 1,178,963,000 
OTHRS BUDGET 586,759,991 619,279,256 665,100,000 709,230,000 
TOTAL 4,159,341,086 4,386,035,006 4,551,900,000 4,640,639,000 
FISCAL YEAR 1994 
JGSDF BUDGET 1,702,702,000 
JMSDF BUDGET 1,110,515,000 
JASDF BUDGET 1,133,515,000 
OTHRS BUDGET 736,816,000 
TOTAL 4,683,548,000 





TREND IN EACH SERVICE'S BUDGET AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP IN JAPAN(BY 
ORGANIZATION) 
FISCAL YEAR 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
JGSDF BUDGET 0.332% 0.351% 0.388% 0.370% 0.379% 
JMSDF BUDGET 0.182% 0.169% 0.187% 0.185% 0.200% 
JASDF BUDGET 0.213% 0.212% 0.215% 0.214% 0.208% 
OTHER'S BUDGET 0.105% 0.105% 0.110% 0.107% 0.115% 
TOTAL 0.831% 0.837% 0.900% 0.877% 0.903% 
FISCAL YEAR 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
JGSDF BUDGET 0.371% 0.358% 0.357% 0.356% 0.365% 
JMSDF BUDGET 0.196% 0.206% 0.209% 0.170% 0.232% 
JASDF BUDGET 0.208% 0.208% 0.213% 0.229% 0.248% 
OTHER'S BUDGET 0.128% 0.129% 0.128% 0.131% 0.133% 
TOTAL 0.903% 0.900% 0.906% 0.933% 0.978% 
FISCAL YEAR 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
JGSDF BUDGET 0.364% 0.369% 0.371% 0.367% 0.364% 
JMSDF BUDGET 0.239% 0.233% 0.236% 0.246% 0.258% 
JASDF BUDGET 0.256% 0.263% 0.259% 0.256% 0.256% 
OTHER'S BUDGET 0.133% 0.132% 0.128% 0.135% 0.136% 
TOTAL 0.991% 0.997% 0.993% 1.004% 1.013% 
FISCAL YEAR 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
JGSDF BUDGET 0.354% 0.354% 0.340% 0.338% 0.337% 
JMSDF BUDGET 0.249% 0.234% 0.236% 0.227% 0.219% 
JASDF BUDGET 0.264% 0.269% 0.243% 0.238% 0.238% 
OTHER'S BUDGET 0.138% 0.141% 0.135% 0.138% 0.143% 
TOTAL 1.006% 0.997% 0.954% 0.941% 0.937% 
FISCAL YEAR 1994 
JGSDF BUDGET 0.345% 
JMSDF BUDGET 0.225% 
JASDF BUDGET 0.229% 
OTHER'S BUDGET 0.149% 
TOTAL 0.948% 
Source : Kaijoujieitai Yosan Jimuteiyou 
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APPENDIX  L. 
TREND   IN  JMSDF  BUDGET(BY   3   COMPONENTS) 
FISCAL YEAR 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 
1.   Personnel t Provisions 3,751,705 5,551,961 6,688,630 7,106,355 8,121,650 9,586,280 11,382,979 13,734,107 
Personnel *• ** • • ** • * • • ** ** 
Provisions «» • • • • ** ** •* • • ** 
2.   Flont-Line 5,544,680 8,165,571 5,200,543 7,133,104 11,267,817 13,480,314 15,014,571 14,436,714 
Ship 5,544,680 7,804,378 5,200,543 6,711,416 8,195,834 9,460,712 8,005,970 6,967,694 
Aircraft 0 361,193 0 421,688 3,073,243 3,984,413 6,011,726 6,016,785 
Aannition 0 0 0 0 1,740 35,189 996,875 1,452,235 
3.   Others 9,715,952 9,137,007 10,035,936 11,430,341 12,813,561 13,525,306 16,025,476 19,295,435 
4.   TOTAL 19,012,337 22,854,539 21,925,109 25,669,800 32,203,028 36,591,900 42,423,026 47,466,256 
FISCAL YEAR 1963 1964 196 5 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
1. Personnel &  Provisions 16,024,315 18,964,681 22,702,398 25,731,298 28,931,137 33,429,846 38,523,576 45,595,607 
Personnel • » • * • • *» ** • * ■ • 42,431,809 
Provisions • • ** *• »* ** ** • • 3,163,798 
2. Flont-Line 13,305,675 16,520,257 19,933,305 20,398,770 23,371,295 27,669,137 36,850,351 51,097,600 
Ship 9,526,228 10,717,186 13,657,606 14,836,034 17,220,429 18,751,384 21,071,000 22,815,329 
Aircraft 2,270,371 3,960,605 4,059,427 3,348,111 3,497,407 6,314,583 13,030,092 25,329,498 
Anunition 1,509,076 1,842,466 2216272 2,214,625 2,653,459 2,603,170 2,749,259 29,527,732 
3. Others 22,504,971 22,556,593 25,426,287 28,914,099 32,693,402 36,170,624 39,033,417 42,587,984 
4. TOTAL 51,834,961 58,041,531 68,061,990 75,044,167 84,995,834 97,269,607 114,407,344 139,281,191 
FISCAL YEAR 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
1.   Personnel & Provisions 54,233,668 64,296,981 76,188,068 94,699,262 122,846,066 149,937,055 163,262,653 179,762,677 
Personnel 50,738,044 60,446,785 71,863,917 89,787,989 117,101,727 143,507,653 156,835,786 172,738,026 
Provision s 3,495,624 3,850,196 4,324,151 4,911,273 5,744,339 6,429,402 6,426,867 7,024,651 
2-   Flont-Line 64,076,797 74,074,522 76,220,965 76,302,541 67,798,003 79,282,791 94,825,664 122,036,601 
Ship 30,463,008 35,369,449 36,573,559 43,439,960 30,505,971 45,435,678 54,778,854 80,355,593 
Aircraft 30,001,167 34,986,618 35,519,312 28,196,529 32,013,465 27,302,695 32,247,862 34,760,293 
Anun ition 3,612,622 3,718,455 4128094 4,666,032 5,278,567 6,544,418 7,798,948 6,920,715 
3.   Others 43,909,630 49,491,948 62,043,894 67,990,764 77,403,452 84,831,154 99,067,873 119,309,580 
4.   TOTAL 162,220,095 187,863,451 214,452,927 238,992,567 268,047,521 314,051,000 357,156,190 421,108,858 
FISCAL YEAR 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
1. Personnel t Provisions 185,334,281 191,297,957 203^530,509 219,986,573 221,455,053 241,612,693 258,862,767 282,669,925 
Personnel 178,487,242 183,657,108 195,220,126 211,933,374 213,610,019 233,337,365 250,243,013 273,905,603 
Provisions 6,847,039 7,640,849 8,310,383 8,053,199 7,845,034 8,275,328 8,619,754 8,764,322 
2. Flont-Line 129,885,952 159_,706,698 184,520,099 205,031,650 224,606,414 280,595,496 278,395,331 313,741,813 
Ship 90,752,394 116,159,631 129,848,344 129,010,634 145,533,804 167,256,728 167,226,780 173,761,134 
Aircraft 29,969,429 33,770,764 44,384,208 61,917,254 63,562,177 94,498,117 89,744,488 113,136,954 
Avonition 9,164,129 9,776,303 10287547 14,103,762 15,510,433 18,840,651 21,424,063 26,843,725 
3. Others 138,783,614 158,652,455 165,112,304 177,884,036 207,975,650 183,775,385 196,008,477 196,874,686 
4. TOTAL 454,003,847 509,657,110 553,162,912 602,902,259 654,037,117 705,983,574 733,266,575 793,286,424 
FISCAL YEAR 1987 1986 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
1. Personnel &  Provisions 301,194,097 310,677,258 311,969,791 317,413,953 331,612,132 352,070,892 365,255,946 
Personnel 292,209,296 301,411,255 302,651,459 307,889,707 323,319,513 344,950,847 357,982,462 
Provisions 8,984,801 9,266,003 9,318,332 9,524,246 8,292,619 7,120,045 7,273,484 
2. Flont-Line 338,066,676 383,589,887 365,232,202 317,391,989 424,201,621 367,768,428 351,512,700 
Ship 171,185,059 197,900,806 186,803,025 140,526,832 190,080,170 166,575,259 176,908,526 
Aircraft 136,201,730 154,620,946 142,162,227 133,067,936 181,779,526 155,759,020 128,925,907 
Amun ition 30_,679t887 31,068,135 36266950 43,797,221 53,342,125 45,434,149 45,678,265 
3. Others 222,287,431 246,481,678 294,357,843 341,216,641 329,569,251 380,315,090 368,137,119 
4. TOTAL 861,548,204 940,748,823 971,559,836 976,022,583 1,085,383,204 1,100,154,410 1,084,905,765 




TREND   IN  JMSDF  TYPICAL  WAGES(BY  RANK) 
|Year 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Rank 
CPT 62,200 65400 68,600 72,700 81,400 85,000 89,500 96,500 103,300 137,900 153,900 168,200 162,500 
CDR 52,300 55,500 58,400 62,400 69,400 77,900 82,500 89,000 97,700 116,700 130,000 143,500 157,300 
LCDR 46,000 49,000 53,800 57,800 64,300 72,200 76,500 82,600 89,200 105,300 117,400 130,600 143,700 
LT 39,600 42,100 46,700 49,700 56,200 59,800 63,100 68,000 73,500 83,700 93,000 103,400 113,400 
LTJG 31,900 34,100 40,800 43,600 49,500 52,400 55,600 59,800 64,600 58,100 66, 100 74^600 82,800 
ENS 29,800 31,900 38,400 41,100 45,100 47,700 50,500 54,200 58,800 49,300 57,000 64,700 72,200 
HO - - _ - - - _ - _ - 90,300 103,800 115,100 
HPO - - - - - - _ - - - _ - - 
POl 29,785 31,800 37,850 40,575 44,710 47,340 50,170 53,880 58,520 77,900 77,900 87,700 67,100 
P02 24,100 23,300 27,700 29,600 32,400 34_,300 36,400 39,100 42,500 49,600 56,900 62,600 69/300 
P03 16,800 17,800 21,600 23,200 25,400 27,600 29,400 33,200 36,300 41,300 48,200 55,200 61,800 
LS 11,900 12,900 14,400 15,700 17,400 19,100 20,400 21,900 24,300 30,800 37,300 43^400 49,500 
SN 9,100 10,000 11,500 12,800 14,400 16,100 17,300 18,700 20,800 26,400 32,300 37,300 45,000 
SA 7,600 8,600 10,100 11,400 12,800 14,100 15,100 15,900 17,600 20,500 25,100 30,000 35,600 
Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Rank 
CPT 211,200 270,800 296,700 317,400 339,800 351,100 362,300 377,300 395,100 396,900 404,500 418,200 441,900 
CDR 179,600 231,600 255,900 274,600 294,400 305,600 316,700 331,200 347,500 348,800 355,900 367,500 398,300 
LCDR 166,000 214,900 238,100 255,000 273,500 283,700 294,000 307,700 323,100 324,000 330,400 341,200 372,000 
LT 130,800 169_L100 187,400 200,800 214,900 233,300 231,700 242,500 255,100 255,600 260,900 270,000 286,200 
LTJG 96,800 125,800 139,600 149,600 160,200 166,400 172,700 180,900 190,800 191,200 195,300 202,300 213,800 
ENS 84,900 110,800 123,100 131,600 141,000 146,400 152,000 158,900 167,600 167,800 171,300 177,400 187,500 
HO 134,400 178,600 203,300 223,400 245,000 259,300 274,300 297,200 312,200 312,600 324,000 340,000 363,700 
HPO - 183,200 207,100 236,900 254,700 264,300 273,900 286,300 300,900 301,300 307,300 317,900 336,600 
POl 114,300 148,800 164,000 186,100 199,300 206,800 214,300 224,000 236,200 236,600 241,100 249,700 264,600 
P02 86,100 112,600 124,200 143,300 153,400 159,500 201,300 173,300 182,800 183,200 186,800 193,400 204,500 
P03 80,100 105,900 107,300 125,300 134,100 139,400 144,700 151,300 159,500 159,800 163,000 168,700 178,700 
LS 59,500 79,000 86,900 103,500 110,700 114,400 118,400 123,300 130,000 130,100 132,700 137,400 145,200 
SN 54,300 72,000 79,000 94,800 101,300 104,600 107,900 112,200 117,800 118,000 120,200 124,200 131,200 
SA 43,500 58,200 64,000 78,500 83,700 85,800 88,400 91,600 96,000 96,200 98,000 101,400 107,400 
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Rank 
CPT 452,600 459,400 470,100 483,500 499,000 513,300 521,400 528,300 533,700 
CDR 407,400 413,300 423,500 436,400 450,500 464,700 472,900 479,900 484,500 
LCDR 380,600 386,300 395,600 407,200 420,200 434,300 442,700 449,800 454,500 
LT 293,200 297,600 305,300 314,800 325_,80© 337,400 346,300 353,500 357,900 
LTJG 218,900 222,200 227,800 235,500 244,300 257,300 266,000 271,500 275,000 
ENS 191,900 194,900 200,000 207,200 218,100 231,300 239,800 245,000 284,000 
HO 377,200 382,900 392,900 404,200 427,600 441,600 451,000 459,600 459,800 
HPO 344,900 350,500 359,900 370,700 383,700 396,200 405,900 414,000 419,100 
POl 271,000 275,200 282,300 291,800 302,400 313,300 322,800 329,500 333,400 
P02 209,400 212,700 218,300 225,600 234,500 246,800 256,300 261,700 265,200 
P03 183,000 185,900 191,000 198,200 209,500 222,700 231,700 236,700 239,500 
LS 148,800 151,500 148,100 154,700 168,100 179,200 198,100 193,300 183,500 
SN 134,300 136,800 140,800 146,800 157,800 168,000 177,500 181,500 204,800 
SA 110,200 112,400 115,800 121,000 133,900 142,800 151,800 162,500 164,300 
Source  i   JIEXKAN UOUXYUU HYOU  1960-1994   (Defense Agency) 
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APPENDIX  N. 
TREND   IN  RECRUITMENT  OF  JSDF  PERSONNEL   (BY  SERVICE) 








23,500 22,050 20,500 22,000 22,200 22,200 23,000 22,885 21,531 19,000 19,200 
103,961 69,085 64,820 64,761 47,830 46,600 46,683 42,991 42,340 39,816 40,948 
25,179 17,556 21,881 22,008 22,290 22,843 24,144 22,964 21,918 19,000 19,420 
4.1 3.9 3.0 2.9 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.1 







3,450 1,700 3,250 4,150 1,835 4,190 4,312 4,665 4,850 4,669 3,919 
22,836 5,558 11,600 14,092 6,949 9,109 9,920 8,307 9,548 9,581 7,758 
3,828 1,414 3,662 4,441 1,853 4,444 4,515 4,490 4,936 4,688 3,762 
6.0 3.9 3.2 3.2 3.8 2.0 2.2 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.1 







5,100 3,850 4,671 4,175 3,250 4,909 4,512 5,063 5,619 3,481 4,180 
23,277 15,175 12,805 11,344 7,805 8,821 9,168 8,909 11,177 7,785 8,278 
5,929 3,719 4,983 4,311 3,185 5,082 5,103 5,215 5,945 3,488 4,212 
3.9 4.1 2.6 2.6 2.5 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.0 







32,050 27,600 28,421 30,325 27,285 31,299 31,824 32,613 32,000 27,150 27,299 
150,074 89,818 89,225 90,197 62,584 64,530 65,771 60,207 63,065 57,182 56,984 
34,936 22,689 30,526 30,760 27,328 32,369 33,762 32,669 32,799 27,176 27,394 
4.3 4.0 2.9 2.9 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.1 
109.0« 82.2« 107.4« 101.4« 100.2« 103.4« 106.1« 100.2« 102.5» 100.1« 100.3« 








19,400 18,300 14,371 15,120 15,400 14,180 15,950 15,600 16,150 14,980 13,633 
45,199 42,430 32,476 32,171 33,942 30,177 32,280 30,768 33,673 31,583 29,860 
21,024 18,533 14,371 15,161 15,388 14,201 16,582 15,505 15,670 13,767 13,331 
2.1 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.1 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.2 







5,300 5,000 3,255 1,136 3,618 2,100 1,836 3,520 1,779 2,394 3,236 
10,244 12,700 8,197 3,488 5,738 4,251 3,857 5,762 6,294 3,815 5,043 
4,736 5,384 3,255 1,140 3,684 2,101 1,728 3,195 2,585 1,524 3,297 
2.2 2.4 2.5 3.1 1.6 2.0 2.2 1.8 2.4 2.5 1.5 







5,100 4,800 3,262 1,127 3,630 2,080 2,025 2,850 1,991 2,440 4,275 
11.277 13,002 9,002 4,399 6,477 5,624 5,344 6,506 6,B47 4,799 6,391 
5,214 5,387 3,262 1,129 3,617 2,087 2,224 3,055 2,457 735 4,203 
2.2 2.4 2.8 3.9 1.8 2.7 2.4 2.1 2.8 6.5 1.5 







29,800 28,100 20,688 17,383 22,648 18,360 19,811 21,970 19,910 19,814 21,144 
66,720 68,132 49,675 40,058 46,157 40,052 41,481 43,036 46,814 40,197 41,294 
30,974 29,304 20,888 17,430 22,689 18,389 20,534 21,755 20,712 16,026 20,831 
2.2 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.0 
103.9« 104.3« 100.0« 100.3« 100.2« 100.2« 103.6« 99.0» 104.0« 80.9» 98.5« 








14,630 16,100 16,068 14,793 15,663 14,951 14,457 14,726 10,240 8,801 
31,242 34,832 35,197 34,000 30,908 29,226 24,267 23,986 20,528 13,508 
14,733 16,114 15,502 14,517 15,721 14,942 6,664 13,193 6,695 2,730 
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.0 3.6 1.8 3.1 4.9 







2,406 2,481 2,209 3,359 3,398 3,224 2,954 3,330 1,720 1,760 
6,616 4,927 5,152 6,197 5,595 5,938 5,412 4,966 3,568 2,445 
2,652 2,093 2,087 3,358 3,251 3,098 1,620 2,710 319 901 
2.5 2.4 2.5 1.8 1.7 1.9 3.3 1.8 11.2 2.7 







2,007 2,636 1,564 1,761 3,956 1,836 1,905 3,800 1,700 2,700 
5,425 5,500 5,720 5,385 6,688 5,465 4,451 6,866 5,738 3,810 
738 2,720 1,562 1,758 3,903 2,220 221 3,685 1,145 1,150 
7.4 2.0 3.7 3.1 1.7 2.5 20.1 1.9 5.0 3.3 







19,043 21,217 19,841 19,913 23,017 20,011 19,316 21,856 13,660 13,261 
43,283 45,259 46,069 45,582 43,191 40,629 34,130 35,818 29,834 19,763 
18,123 20,927 19,151 19,633 22,875 20,260 8,505 19,588 8,159 4,781 
2.4 2.2 2.4 2.3 1.9 2.0 4.0 1.8 3.7 4.1 
95.2» 98.6« 96.5« 98.6« 99.4» 101.2« 44.0« 89.6« 59.7» 36.1« 
Sourcei   BOUEI HAHDBOOK(ASAGUMU  SHINBUNSHA) 
JINNJI JzUHPOU  (Defense Agency) 
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APPENDIX  O. 
TREND   IN  SHIP'S   COMPLEMENT   (BY   TYPE) 
Year Type Name DISPL COMPL. 
COMPL. / 
DISPL. 
1962 DD YAMAGUMO 2,050 220 0.107 
1963 DD TAKATSUKI 3,100 260 0.084 
1963 DD MAKIGUMO 2,050 210 0.102 
1964 DD KIKUZUKI 3,050 260 0.085 
1964 DD ASAGUMO 2,050 210 0.102 
1965 DD MOTIZÜKI 3,100 270 0.087 
1965 DD MINEGÜMO 2,100 220 0.105 
1966 DD NAGATSUKI 3,100 270 0.087 
1966 DD NATSUGÜMO 2,100 210 0.100 
1967 DD MURAKUMO 2,150 220 0.102 
1969 DD AOKUMO 2,150 220 0.102 
1971 DD ASAGUMO 2,150 210 0.098 
1974 DD YUGUMO 2,150 220 0.102 
1977 DD HATSUYÜKI 2,950 200 0.068 
1978 DD SHIRAYOKI 2,950 200 0.068 
1979 DD MINEYÜKI 2,950 200 0.068 
1979 DD SAWAYUKI 2,950 200 0.068 
1979 DD HAMAYDKI 2,950 200 0.068 
1980 DD ISOYÜKI 2,950 200 0.068 
1980 DD HARÜYÜKI 2,950 200 0.068 
1981 DD YAMAYUKI 3,050 200 0.066 
1981 DD MATSUYUKI 3,050 200 0.066 
1982 DD SETOYUKI 3,050 200 0.066 
1982 DD ASAYOKI 3,050 200 0.066 
1982 DD SHIMAYUKI 3,050 200 0.066 
1983 DD ASAGIRI 3,500 220 0.063 
1984 DD YAMAGIRI 3,500 220 0.063 
1984 DD YDGIRI 3,500 220 0.063 
1984 DD AMAGIRI 3,500 220 0.063 
1985 DD HAMAGIRI 3,550 220 0.062 
1985 DD SETOGIRI 3,550 220 0.062 
1985 DD SAWAGIRI 3,550 220 0.062 
1986 DD ÜMIGIRI 3,550 220 0.062 
1991 DD MURASAME 4,400 170 0.039 
1960 DDG AMATSUKAZE 3,050 290 0.095 
1971 DDG TACHIKAZE 3,850 250 0.065 
1973 DDG ASAKAZE 3,850 250 0.065 
1978 DDG SAWAKAZE 3,950 255 0.065 
1981 DDG HATAKAZE 4,600 260 0.057 
1983 DDG SHIMAKAZE 4,650 260 0.056 
1988 DDG KONGO 7,200 300 0.042 
1990 DDG KIRISHIMA 7,200 300 0.042 
1991 DDG MYOKO 7,200 300 0.042 
1968 DDH HARUNA 4,700 370 0.079 
1970 DDH HIEI 4,700 370 0.079 
1975 DDH SHIRANE 5,200 350 0.067 
1976 DDH KURAMA 5,200 360 0.069 
1967 DE TIKÜGO 1470 165 0.112 
1968 DE AYASE 1480 165 0.111 
1968 DE MIKUMA 1470 165 0.112 
1969 DE TOKATI 1470 165 0.112 
1970 DE IWASE 1470 165 0.112 
1970 DE CHITOSE 1480 165 0.111 
1971 DE NIYODO 1470 165 0.112 
1972 DE TESHIO 1500 160 0.107 
1972 DE YOSHINO 1500 160 0.107 
1972 DE KUMANO 1500 165 0.110 
1973 DE NOSHIRO 1500 160 0.107 
1977 DE ISHIKARI 1290 90 0.070 
1979 DE YÜBÄRI 1470 95 0.065 
Year Type Name DISPL. COMPL. 
COMPL./ 
DISPL. 
1980 DE YOBETSU 1470 95 0.065 
1986 DE ABUKUMA 2000 120 0.060 
1986 DE JINTSUU 2000 120 0.060 
1987 DE OOYODO 2000 120 0.060 
1987 DE SENDAI 2000 120 0.060 
1989 DE CHIKÜMA 2000 120 0.060 
1989 DE TONE 2000 120 0.060 
1967 SS ÜZOSHIO 1,850 75 0.041 
1968 SS MAKISHIO 1,850 75 0.041 
1969 SS ISOSHIO 1,850 75 0.041 
1970 SS NARUSHIO 1,850 75 0.041 
1971 SS KUROSHIO 1,850 75 0.041 
1972 SS TAKASHIO 1,850 75 0.041 
1973 SS YAESHIO 1,850 75 0.041 
1975 SS YÜSHIO 2,200 75 0.034 
1977 SS MOCHISHIO 2,200 75 0.034 
1978 SS SETOSHIO 2,200 75 0.034 
1979 SS OKISHIO 2,200 75 0.034 
1980 SS NADASHIO 2,250 75 0.033 
1981 SS HAMASHIO 2,250 75 0.033 
1982 SS AKISHIO 2,250 75 0.033 
1983 SS TAKESHIO 2,250 75 0.033 
1984 SS YUKISHIO 2,250 75 0.033 
1985 SS SACHISHIO 2,250 75 0.033 
1986 SS HAMASHIO 2,450 75 0.031 
1987 SS NATSUSHIO 2,450 75 0.031 
1988 SS HAYASHIO 2,450 75 0.029 
1989 SS ARASHIO 2,450 75 0.029 
1990 SS WAKASHIO 2,450 75 0.029 
1991 SS FÜYOSHIO 2,450 75 0.029 
1992 SS 04SS 2,450 75 0.029 
1993 SS 05SS 2,500 70 0.028 
: JANE'S FIGHTING SHIP 
iKANTEI TO KOUKUÜKI SHDU 




TREND IN JAPAN'S DEFENSE EXPENDITURES(BY EXPENSE) 
FISCAL YEAR 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
PERSONNEL & 
PROVISIONS 529,646,420 702,088,220 847,656,901 930,391,598 1,034,505,944 
CURRENT- 
YEAR 




OÜTRAY 258,591,749 272,466,501 292,195,474 351,572,621 397,672,032 
TOTAL 1,093,023,895 1,327,321,872 1,512,350,596 1,690,613,325 1,901,029,593 
FISCAL YEAR 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
PERSONNEL & 
PROVISIONS 1,076,450,985 1,099,977,831 1,144,369,784 1,205,311,648 1,225,824,750 
CURRENT- 
YEAR 




OUTRAY 445,627,130 522,339,473 624,586,984 701,484,503 855,224,397 
TOTAL 2,094,489,291 2,230,202,478 2,400,018,909 2,586,135,471 2,754,234,383 
FISCAL YEAR 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
PERSONNEL & 
PROVISIONS 1,309,441,289 1,413,952,438 1,508,551,282 1,543,867,016 1,578,864,769 
CURRENT- 
YEAR 




OUTRAY 983,132,904 1,073,470,276 1,169,860,401 1,264,973,154 1,530,975,954 
TOTAL 2,934,644,784 3,137,148,148 3,343,549,070 3,517,433,781 3,880,327,940 
FISCAL YEAR 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
PERSONNEL & 
PROVISIONS 1,613,580,741 1,668,028,636 1,756,766,471 1,880,769,818 1,939,563,630 
CURRENT- 
YEAR 




OUTRAY 1,467,178,674 1,582,878,247 1,700,115,710 1,732,918,169 1,747,894,974 
TOTAL 3,918,834,295 4,159,341,086 4,386,035,006 4,551,839,223 4,645,639,274 
Source   :   Kaijyoujieitai    Yosan    Jimteiyou     (Kaijyoubakuryoukanbu) 
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APPENDIX  Q. 
JMSDF  SHIP   INVENTORIES   COMPARED WITH  OTHER  COUNTRIES 
RUSSIA U.S. US(PACIFIC) FRANCE U.K. 
QT* 
DISPLACEMENT 
(FULL  TON) QTT 
DISPLACEMENT 
fFULL TOH} QTJf 
DISPLACEMENT 
(FULL  TON) OTT 
DISPLACEMENT 
(FULL TON) QT* 
DISPLACEMENT 
(FULL  TON) 
SSBN 48 624,200 17 287,250 8 150,000 5 44,600 4 48,800 
SSGN 22 215,000 6 16,020 
SSG 5 19,250 
SSN 53 374,500 85 534,398 30 183,562 12 65,800 
SS 65 198,548 7 10,154 2 4,910 
CV 2 112,000 11 978,493 6 533,412 2 65,560 2 41,200 
CL 14 186,750 37 351,375 17 162,335 1 13,270 
DO 33 243,774 40 329,646 20 165,014 15 75,006 12 51,500 
FF 139 263,900 35 139,342 13 52,376 24 41,200 24 107,600 
HH 222 92,879 15 18,725 21 11,385 23 16,620 
AH 72 233,234 42 828,585 25 474,235 9 40,650 1 16,950 
TOTAL 675 2,564,035 282 3,467,814 119 1,720,934 90 317,845 80 353,380 
JAPAN U.S.   Shipo 
Hone poted  in Japan 
CHINA NORTt XOREA SOUTH KOREA 
QTT 
DISPLACEMENT 
(FULL TON) OTY 
DISPLACEMENT 
(FULL  TON) QT3f 
DISPLACEMENT 
(FULL TON) QTSf 
DISPLACEMENT 
(FULL  TON) QTX 
DISPLACEMENT 
(FULL  TON) 
SSBH 1 8,000 
SSGN 
SSG 1 2,100 
SSN 5 25,000 
SS 17 43,210 38 71,804 21 38,430 2 2,570 
CV 1 80,643 
CL 2 18,932 
DD 41 160,635 3 24,120 18 66,590 7 24,290 
FF 20 36,630 4 15,938 38 68,426 3 4,845 9 20,100 
HH 35 24,485 4 83,289 68 30,353 29 1,740 14 6,130 
AH 8 11,830 62 135,080 31 4,495 16 41,520 
TOTAL 121 276,790 14 222,922 231 407,353 84 49,510 48 94,610 
(MIDGET SS) 60 5,400 11 1,189 
(CORVETTES1 5 3,110 27 32,364 
(TOTAL) 149 58,020 86 128,163 
JAKE'S FIGHTIBG SHIP 1994-95 
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APPENDIX  R. 
SHIP  BUILD  LINE(1/5) 
SHIP BUJXT COMPL. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
SS YUUSHIO 1980 75 75 
HOTISHIO 198] 75 75 ] 75 
SETOSHIO 1982 75 75 ] 75 1 75 
OKISHIO 198; 75 75 1 75 1 75 1 75 
HADASH 10 198^ 75 75 3 75 1 75 1 75 1 75 
HAHASHIO 1985 75 75 3 75 1 75 1 75 1 75 75 
AXISHIO 1986 75 75 ] 75 1 75 t 75 1 75 75 1 75 
TAKESHIO 198-; 75 75 ] 75 1 75 1 75 1 75 75 1 75 1 75 
YUXISHIO 198E 75 75 ] 75 J 75 1 75 1 75 75 1 75 1 75 1 75 
SATISHIO 1989 75 75 3 75 ] 75 1 75 1 75 75 3 75 1 75 3 75 1         75 
HARUSHIO 199C 75 75 3 75 3 75 ] 75 ] 75 75 3 75 1 75 1 75 1         75 3 75 
NATSUSHIO 199 J 75 75 J 75 1 75 1 75 1 75 75 3 75 1 75 1 75 1         75 3 75 1         75 
HAXASHIO 1992 75 75 1 75 1 75 1 75 1 75 75 1 75 1 75 1 75 1         75 3 75 1         75 
ARASHIO 1995 75 75 3 75 1 75 1 75 3 75 75 1 75 ] 75 1 75 1         75 1 75 1         75 
HAKASHXO 1994 75 75 1 75 ] 75 ] 75 1 75 75 1 75 1 75 1 75 1         75 3 75 1         75 
HUYUSHIO 1995 75 75 1 75 1 75 1 75 1 75 75 1 75 1 75 1 75 1         75 1 75 1         75 
04SS 1996 75 1 75 1 75 1 75 I 75 75 1 75 1 75 1 75 1         75 1 75 1         75 
05SS 1997 70 1 70 1 70 1 70 70 I 70 1 70 1 70 1         70 1 70 1         70 
06SS 1998 70 1 70 3 70 70 3 70 1 70 1 70 1          70 1 70 1         70 
07SS 1999 70 1 70 70 1 70 1 70 1 70 1          70 1 70 1         70 
08SS 2000 70 70 1 70 1 70 1 70 1         70 1 70 1          70 
09SS 2001 70 1 70 1 70 I 70 1          70 1 70 1          70 
10SS 2002 70 1 70 1 70 1         70 1 70 1          70 
11SS 2003 70 1 70 1         70 1 70 1         70 
12SS 2004 70 1           70 1 70 1          70 
13SS 2005 70 1 70 1         70 
14SS 2006 70 1         70 
15SS 2007 70 
16SS 2008 70 
17SS 2009 70 
18SS 2010 70 
19SS 2011 70 
20SS 2012 70 
2 ISS 2013 70 
22SS 2014 70 
23SS 2015 70 
24SS 2016 70 
25SS 2017 70 
26SS 2018 70 
27SS 2019 70 
28SS 2020 70 
SUBTOTAL 16 1,200 16 1,200 16 1,195 16 1,190 16 1,165 16 1,180 16 1,175116 1,170 16 1,165   16   1,160 16 1,155   16   1,150 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
75 
75 75 
75 75 75 
75 75 75 75 
75 75 75 75 75 
70 70 70 70 70 70 
70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 1           70 
70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 L          70 
70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 1           70 70 1          70 
70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 1           70 70 1         70 
70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 1           70 70 1          70 
70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 1           70 70 1          70 
70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
70 70 70 70 70 70 70 1           70 70 1          70 
70 70 70 70 70 70 l          70 70 L          70 
70 70 70 70 70 I           70 70 70 
70 70 70 70 70 70 1          70 
70 70 70 70 70 70 
70 70 l         70 70 70 
70 70 70 I          70 
l           70 70 1          70 
70 L          70 
70 
16 1,145 16 1,140 16 1,135 16 1,055 16 1,125 16 1,120 16 1,120 16 1,120 16 1,120 16 1,120 16 1,120   1 1,120 16 1,120   1 )   1,120 
115 
SHIP  BUILD  LINE   (2/5) 
SHIP BUILT COMPL.|       1995 1996      |      1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
UD TAKATSUXI 1967 261 1 2 61 ; 261 : 261 
X3XUZUKI 1961 261 : 26( : 26< ; 261 : 260 
HINEGUHO 1961 211 : 21( ; 211 ; 210 1 210 
HOTIZUKI 1969 27) : 27( : 271 : 271 ; 270 1 270 
NATSUGUMO 1969 21( : 21( : 211 : 21( i 210 : 21( 
NAGATSUXI 197E 27( 3 27( : 271 : 27( : 270 i 27( : 271 
MURAKUHO 197( 22( ] 22( : 221 : 22( ; 220 i 220 7 22( 
AOKUHO 1972 21( ] 21( l 210 l 210 l 211 i 2 It 1 210 1 210 ' 210 
AKIGUHO 1974 220 ] 22C i 221 ] 22( ] 22( ] 220 1 221 1 220 1 22C 3 220 1 220 
YUUGUMO 1978 22( 3 22C ] 22< ] 22( l 22( l 22( 1 220 1 220 1 220 1 220 1 22< 1 220 1 220 
HATSUYUXI 1982 20< 3 20C : 20( : 20« 3 200 l 200 1 20( 1 20( 1 20C 1 20C 1 20C 1 20( 1 200 
SHtRAYUKI 1983 20C 1 20C i 20( 3 20C 1 20( l 200 1 200 1 20< 1 20C 1 20C 1 20C 1 200 1 200 
MIH3SYUKI 1984 20C 3 20C ] 20( 3 20C 3 20C l 200 1 200 1 200 1 200 1 200 1 20C 1 200 3 200 
SAWAYUKI 1984 200 1 20C : 20C 3 20C 1 200 ] 200 3 20C 3 20C 3 200 1 20C 3 20C 1 200 1 200 
HAMAYUXI 1983 20C 1 200 3 20C 3 20(1 1 200 l 200 1 20C 1 20C 3 200 1 200 1 20C I 200 1 200 
ISOYUXI 1985 20C 1 200 ] 20C 3 200 1 200 i 200 1 20C 1 20C 3 200 1 20G 1 20C 1 200 3 200 
HARUYUKI 1985 20G 1 200 ] 20G 3 20G 1 200 l 200 1 200 1 200 1 200 1 200 1 200 1 200 1 200 
YAMAYUKI 1985 200 1 200 3 200 ] 200 1 200 l 200 1 200 3 200 1 200 1 200 3 200 1 200 3 200 
MATSUYUKI 1986 200 1 200 i 200 3 200 X 200 l 200 1 200 1 200 1 200 I 200 1 200 3 200 1 200 
SETOYUKI 1986 200 1 200 i 200 3 200 1 200 l 200 1 200 1 200 1 200 1 200 1 200 1 200 1 200 
ASAYUKI 1987 200 1 200 l 200 1 200 1 200 l 2O0 1 200 1 200 1 200 1 200 1 200 1 200 1 200 
SHIMAYUKI 1987 20O 1 200 l 200 1 200 1 200 l 200 1 200 1 200 1 200 1 200 1 200 1 200 3 200 
ASAGIRI 1988 220 1 220 l 220 1 220 1 220 l 220 1 220 1 220 1 220 1 220 1 220 1 220 3 220 
YAHAGXRI 1989 220 1 220 l 220 1 220 1 220 l 220 1 220 1 220 3 220 1 220 1 220 1 220 1 220 
YUUGIRI 1989 220 1 220 i 220 1 220 1 220 l 220 3 220 1 220 1 220 1 220 1 220 1 220 1 220 
AMAGIRI 1989 220 1 220 l 220 1 220 1 220 i 220 3 220 1 220 1 220 3 220 1 220 3 220 1 220 
HAHAGIRI 1990 220 1 220 i 220 1 220 1 220 l 220 1 220 T 220 1 220 1 220 1 220 3 220 1 220 
SETOGDtl 1990 220 1 220 l 220 1 220 1 220 l 220 1 220 1 220 T 220 1 220 1 220 1 220 1 220 
SAHAGUtl 1990 220 1 220 l 220 1 220 1 220 l 220 1 220 1 220 1 220 1 220 1 220 3 220 3 220 
UMIGIRI 1990 220 1 2 20 i 220 1 220 1 220 i 220 I 220 1 220 1 220 1 220 1 220 1 220 1 220 
HARUSAHE 1996 170 l 170 1 170 1 170 l 170 1 170 1 170 I 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 
04DD 1997 170 1 170 1 170 l 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 3 170 3 170 1 170 
06DD 1999 170 l 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 3 170 1 170 
06DD 1999 170 l 170 1 170 1 170 3 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 
07DD 2000 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 
07DD 2000 170 3 170 3 170 1 170 1 170 t 170 3 170 3 170 
08DD 2001 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 3 170 1 170 
09DD 2002 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 3 170 
10DD 2003 170 1 170 3 170 1 170 3 170 
10DD 2003 170 1 170 1 170 3 170 1 170 
HDD 2004 170 1 170 I 170 1 170 
12DD 2005 170 3 170 1 170 
12DD 2005 170 3 170 1 170 
13DD 2006 170 1 170 
13DD 2006 170 3 170 
14DD 2007 170 
15DD 2008 170 
16DD 2009 170 
19DD 2012 170 
2 ODD 2013 170 
21DD 2014 170 
21DD 2014 170 
22DD 2015 170 
22DD 2015 170 
23DD 2016 170 
23DD 2016 170 
24DD 2017 170 
25DD 2018 170 
25DD 2018 170 
26DD 2019 170 
27DD 2020 170 
27DD 2020 170 
SUBTOTAL                  | 30 6,510 31|6,680 32 6,850 31 6,590|31 6,460)31 6,320 30 6,000 31 6,170|32 6,300|33|6,470|34|6,590 36 6,930 
116 
SHIP  BUILD  LINE(2/5) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
220 220 
200 200 200 200 200 200 
200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 170 
170 170 170 




37 7,100 38 7,270 38 7,220 38 7,220 38 7,220 39 7,390 39 7,360 40 7,500 39 7,240 38 6,980 39 7,150 37 6,690 37 6,640 36 6,320 
117 
SHIP  BUILD LINE   (3/5) 
SHIP BUILT COHPL. 1995 1996      |       1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002      |      2003 2004 2005 2006 
DDG AMATSUXA2E 1965 290 290 
TATDCÄ2E 197Ö 250 250 250 250 1 250 ] 250 1 250 ] 250 1 250 1 25C 250 250 250 
ASAKAZE 1979 250 250 250 250 1 250 1 250 1 250 1 250 1 250 : 250 250 250 250 
SAHAKAZE 1983 225 225 225 225 1 225 ^ 225 1 225 1 225 1 225 ■ 225 225 225 225 
HATAKAZE 1986 260 260 26C 260 1 260 i 260 1 260 1 260 1 26C l 260 260 260 260 
SHDOUtAZE 1988 260 260 260 260 1 260 i 260 1 260 1 260 1 260 l 260 260 260 260 
KOHGOU 1993 300 300 30C 300 1 300 l 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 l 300 300 300 300 
KIRISH IMA 1995 300 300 30C 300 1 300 l 300 1 300 3 300 1 30C ] 300 300 300 300 
03DDG 1996 300 300 300 1 300 l 300 1 300 ] 300 1 300 j 300 300 300 300 
050DG 1998 300 1 300 l 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 ] 300 300 300 300 
SUBTOTAL 8 2,135 8 2,145 8 2,145 9 2,445 9 2,445 9 2,445 9 2,445 9 2,445 9 2,445 9 2,445 9 2,445 9 2,445 
DDH HARUNA 1973 370 1 370 1 37C 1 370 1 370 1 370 1 370 1 370 1 370 ] 370 
HIEI 1974 370 1 370 1 370 1 370 1 370 1 370 1 370 1 370 1 370 1 370 ] 370 
SHIRANE 1980 350 1 350 1 350 1 350 1 350 1 350 1 350 1 350 1 350 1 350 ] 350 1 350 1 350 
KURAKA 1981 360 1 360 1 360 1 360 1 360 1 360 1 360 1 360 1 360 ] 360 ] 360 J 360 1 360 
11DDH 2004 300 ] 300 ] 300 1 300 
12DDH 2005 300 ] 300 1 300 
17DDH 2010 300 
18DDH 2011 300 
SUBTOTAL 4 1,450 4 1,450 4 1,450 1,450 4 1,450 4 1,450 4 1,450 4 1,450 4 1,450 4 1,380 4 1,310 4 1,310 
DE CHIJCUGO 1970 165 1 165 1 165 1 165 165 7 165 1 165 
AYASE 1971 165 1 165 1 165 I 165 165 1 165 1 165 165 
HIKUHA 1971 165 1 165 1 165 1 165 165 1 165 1 165 165 
TOKACHI 1972 165 1 165 1 165 1 165 165 1 165 1 165 165 1 165 
IWASE 1972 165 1 165 1 165 1 165 165 1 165 1 165 165 1 165 
CHITOSE 1973 165 1 165 1 165 1 165 165 1 165 1 165 165 1 165 165 
NIYODO 1974 165 1 165 1 165 1 165 165 I 165 1 165 165 1 165 165 165 
TESHIO 1975 160 1 160 1 160 1 160 160 1 160 1 160 160 1 160 160 160 160 
YOSHINO 1975 160 1 160 1 160 1 160 160 1 160 1 160 160 1 160 160 160 160 
XUHANO 1975 165 1 165 I 165 1 165 165 1 165 1 165 165 1 165 165 165 165 
ROSHTJtO 1977 160 1 160 1 160 1 160 160 1 160 1 160 160 1 160 160 160 160 160 
ISHTKARI 1981 90 1 90 1 90 1 90 90 1 90 1 90 90 1 90 90 90 90 90 
YUUBARI 1983 95 1 95 1 95 1 95 95 1 95 1 95 95 1 95 95 95 95 95 
YUUBETSU 1984 95 1 95 1 95 1 95 95 1 95 1 95 95 1 95 95 95 95 95 
ABUXUHA 1989 120 1 120 1 120 1 120 120 1 120 I 120 120 1 120 120 120 120 120 
JINTUU 1990 120 1 120 I 120 1 120 120 1 120 1 120 120 1 120 120 120 120 120 
OOYODO 1991 120 1 120 1 120 1 120 120 1 120 1 120 120 1 120 120 120 120 120 
SEMDAI 1991 120 1 120 1 120 1 120 120 1 120 1 120 120 1 120 120 120 120 120 
CHIKUMA 1993 120 1 120 1 120 1 120 120 1 120 1 120 120 1 120 120 120 120 120 
TONE 1993 120 1 120 1 120 1 120 120 1 120 1 120 120 1 120 120 120 120 120 
11DE 2002 120 1 120 120 120 120 
12DE 2003 120 120 120 120 120 
15DE 2006 120 
18DE 2009 120 
23DE 2014 120 
24DE 2015 120 
24DE 2015 120 
25DE 2016 120 
26DE 2017 120 
27DE 2018 120 
27DE 2018 120 
28DE 2019 120 
29DE 2020 120 
SUBTOTAL 20 2,800 20 2,800 20 2,800 20 2,800 20 2,800 20 2,800 19 2,635 18 2,305 17 2,215 16   2,050 15 1,885 12 1,400 
TOTAL 32 6,385 32 6,395 32 6,395 33 6,695 33 6,695 33 6,695 32 6,530 31 6,200 30 6,110 29|5,875 28 5,640 25 5,155 
1.18 
SHIP  BUILD  LINE(3/5) 
2007 2Q08 2009      |      2010 2011      |      2012 2013 2014 2015     1      2016 2017      1      2018 2019      1      2020 
250 250 
225 225 1 225 1 225 225 225 225 
260 260 1 260 1 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 
260 260 1 260 1 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 
300 300 1 300 1 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 
30C 300 1 300 1 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 
300 300 1 300 1 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 
300 300 1 300 1 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 
8 2,195 8 2,195 7 1,945 7 1,945 7 1,945 7 1,945 7 1,945 6 1,720 6 1,720 6 1,720 5 1,460 4 1,200 4 1,200 4 1,200 
] 350 ] 350 1 350 1 350 
1 360 ] 360 1 360 1 360 360 
1 300 ] 300 1 300 1 300 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 
] 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 
1 300 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 
300 I 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 
4 1,310 4 1,310 4 1,310 5 1,610 5 1,560 4 1,200 4 1,200 4 1,200 4 1,200 4 1,200 4 1,200 4 1,200 4 1,200 4 1,200 
160 
90 90 90 90 90 
95 95 95 95 95 95 95 
95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 
120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
120 120 120 120 120 120 
120 120 120 120 120 120 
120 120 120 120 120 
120 120 120 120 
120 120 120 
120 120 120 
120 120 
120 
13 1,520 12 1,360 13 1,480 13 1,480 13 1,480 12 1,390 12 1,390 12 1,415 13 1,560 14 1,680 15 1,800 17 2,040 18 2,160 18 2,160 
25 5,025 24 4,865 24(4,735 25|5,035 25 4,985 23 4,535 23 4,535 22 4,335 23)4,480 24 4,600 24|4,460 25 4,440 26 4,560 26 4,560 
119 
SHIP  BUILD  LINE   (4/5) 
SHIP BUILT CCMPL. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
HSC HASKZRA 1971 45 ] 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 
THAI 1978 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 
HATSUSHIMA 1979 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 
NDiOSHDtA 1979 45 I 45 1 45 1 45 I 45 1 45 
HTYAJIMA 1980 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 
EKOSHIMA 1980 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 
UXISHQfA 1980 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 
OOSHIKA 1981 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 ] 45 
NX1JIMA 1981 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 3 45 
YAKUSHIMA 1982 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 
MARUSHIMA 1982 45 1 45 I 45 1 45 1 45 I 45 1 45 ] 45 1 45 
CHICHUIHA 1983 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 ] 45 1 45 ] 45 
TORISHMA 1983 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 ] 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 J 45 
HAHAJIKA 1984 45 1 45 ] 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 
TAKASHIHA 1984 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 I 45 1 45 ] 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 
NUWAJMA 1985 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 ] 45 
ETAJIHA 1985 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 ] 45 
KAMISHIMA 1986 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 
KZHESHIHA 1986 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 
OGISHIKA 1987 45 I 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 
HOROSHIMA 1987 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 
YURISHIMA 1988 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 
HIROSHIMA 1988 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 I 45 I 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 
AHASHIMA 1989 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 
SAKUSHD4A 1989 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 
UWAJIHA 1990 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 
IESHXMA 1990 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 
TSUXISHIMA 1993 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 1 45 
MAEJIMA 1993 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 
03MSC 1994 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 T 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 
04MSC 1995 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 
04HSC 1995 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 
04MSC 1995 40 1 40 T 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 
06MSC 1997 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 I 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 
06HSC 1997 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 
07MSC 1999 40 ^ 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 
07MSC 1999 40 i 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 
09MSC 2001 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 
10HSC 2002 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 
11HSC 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 
12MSC 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 
12MSC 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 
13HSC 40 1 40 1 40 
13MSC 40 1 40 1 40 
14HSC 40 1 40 





















SUBTOTAL 33 1,460 33 1,460 35 1,540 35 1,540 35 1,530 33 1,440 31 1,345 30 1,295 29 1,245 29 1,235 29 1,225 29 1,215 
HSO YAEYAMA 1993 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 
TSUSHIMA 1993 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 




1 SUBTOTAL 3 180 3 180 3 180 3 180      3 180 3 180 3 180 3 180 3 180 3 180 3 180 3 180 TOTAL 36 1,640 36   1,640 38 1,720 38 1,720|38 1,710 36 1,620 34 1,525 33 1,475 32 1,425 32 1,415 32 1,405 32   1,395 
120 
SHIP  BUILD  LINE(4/5) 





45 45 45 
45 45 45 
45 45 45 45 
45 45 45 45 
45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
1 40 40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 40 
40 40 40 
40 40 
29 1,205 29 1,195 29 1,185 29 1,175 29 1,165 30 1,205 31 1,245 31 1,240 32 1,280 30 1,200 31 1,240 30 1,200 31 1,240 29 1,160 
1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 60 
1 60 1 60 1 GO 1 60 1 60 1 60 60 
1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 60 
60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 
60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 
1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 
3 180 3 180 3 180 3 180 3 180 3 180 5 300 3 180 3 180 3 180 3 180 3 180 3 180 3 180 
32 1,385 32 1,375 32 1,365 32 1,355 32 1,345 33 1,385 36 1,545 34 1,420 35 1,460 33 1,380 34 1,420 33 1,380 34 1,420 32 1,340 
121 
SHIP  BUILD  LINE   (5/5) 
SHIP BUILT COMPL. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
MSB 11-GOU 1975 10 ] 1C 
12-GOU 1975 10 1 1C 
MST HAYASE 1971 180 1 18C 1 18C 1 180 1 180 1 180 1 180 1 180 
HUKUE 1976 38 1 38 1 3( 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 ] 38 1 38 ] 38 ] 38 
06MST 1997 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 ] 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 
07HST 1998 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 ] 38 1 38 ] 38 1 38 
MMC SOUYA 1971 185 1 185 1 185 1 185 3 185 1 185 1 185 1 185 
LST ATSUMI 1972 100 1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100 
HOTÖBU 1973 95 1 95 1 95 1 95 1 95 1 95 1 95 1 95 1 95 1 95 
NEMURO 1977 95 1 95 1 95 1 95 1 95 1 95 1 95 1 95 1 95 1 95 1 95 1 95 1 95 
MTURA 1975 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 
OJZXA 1976 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 
SATSUHA 1977 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 1 115 
05 LST 1998 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 
LSU YURA 1981 30 1 30 1 30 1 30 1 30 1 30 1 30 1 30 1 30 1 30 1 30 1 30 1 30 
NOTO 1981 30 1 30 1 30 1 30 1 30 1 30 1 30 1 30 1 30 1 30 1 30 1 30 1 30 
ATS AZUMA 1969 185 1 185 1 185 1 185 1 185 1 185 
KUROBE 1989 155 1 155 1 155 1 155 1 155 1 155 1 155 1 155 1 155 1 155 1 155 1 155 1 155 
AGS AKASHI 1969 65 1 65 1 65 1 65 1 65 1 65 
HUTAHI 1978 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 
SUMA 1981 65 1 65 1 65 I 65 1 65 1 65 1 65 1 65 1 65 1 65 1 65 1 65 1 65 
WAXASA 1986 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 
AOS HIBIXI 1991 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 
HARIHA 1992 40 1 40 1 40 ] 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 
AGB SHLRASE 1982 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 
ARC HUROTO 1980 135 1 135 1 135 1 135 1 135 1 135 1 135 1 135 1 135 1 135 1 135 1 135 1 135 
AS(R) HUSHXHI 1970 100 1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100 t 100 1 100 
CHIYODA 1985 120 1 120 1 120 1 120 1 120 1 120 1 120 1 120 1 120 1 120 1 120 1 120 1 120 
ASE KUR1HAHA 1980 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 
AOE SAGAMI 1979 130 1 130 1 130 1 130 1 130 1 130 1 130 1 130 1 130 1 130 1 130 1 130 1 130 
TOHADA 1987 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 
TOKIWA 1990 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 
HAMANA 1990 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 
TV KATORI 1969 230 1 230 
KASHXMA 1996 360 1 360 I 360 1 360 1 360 1 360 1 360 1 360 1 360 1 360 1 360 1 360 
TV  01 1966 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 I 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 
TV  02 1966 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 
Total 33 3,643 31 3,753 32 3,791 34 4,129| 34 4,129 32 3,879| 31 3,779| 29 3,414 28 3,314 27 3,219 27 3,219 26 3,104 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011      |      2012 2013      |      2014 2015 2016 2017      |      2018 2019 2020 
1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 
1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 1 38 
1 95 
115 
300 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300 
30 30 1 30 1 30 1 30 
30 30 1 30 1 30 1 30 
155 155 I 155 1 155 1 155 1 155 1 155 1 155 1 155 1 155 1 155 1 155 1 155 
105 105 0 0 0 0 
65 65 1 65 I 65 1 65 0 
105 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 105 
40 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 
40 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 1 40 
170 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 
135 135 1 135 1 135 
120 120 1 120 1 120 1 120 1 120 1 120 1 120 1 120 
40 40 1 40 1 40 
130 130 1 130 
140 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 140 1 140 1 140 
140 140 1 140 1 140 I 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 
140 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 1 140 
360 360 1 360 1 360 1 360 1 360 1 360 1 360 360 1 360 1 360 1 360 1 360 1 360 
210 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 7 210 1 210 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 
1 210 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 1 210 
24 2,951|         22 2,741 21 2,636 20 2,506 18 2,331 15 2,206|14 2,036 14 2,036 14 2,036 13 1,916 12 1,811 11 1,671 11 1,671 10 1,516 
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APPENDIX S. 
ESTIMATE OF SHIPBUILDING COST (1/7) 
SS (Real Value : 1000 Yen) 
Fiscal 








WAKASHIO 6,606,476 0.000 
0.003 NATSUSHIO 6,674,718 0.010 






OOSHIO 12,058,401 0.807 0.825 
ASASHIO 12,367,682 0.026 
-0.021 HARUSHIO 11,620,773 -0.060 
MICHISHIO 11,003,653 -0.053 








UZUSHIO 15,479,852 0.402 0.284 
MAKISHIO 14,194,970 -0.083 
0.064 
ISOSHIO 14,740,710 0.038 
NARUSHIO 14,571,088 -0.012 
KUROSHIO 13,774,589 -0.055 
TAKASHIO 13,949,194 0.013 











YUUSHIO 28,987,971 0.400 0.873 
MOCHISHIO 29,315,454 0.011 
0.008 
SETOSHIO 29,175,424 -0.005 
OKISHIO 27,925,058 -0.043 
NADASHIO 31,173,098 0.116 
HAMASHIO 31,724,905 0.018 
AKISHIO 32,545,862 0.026 
TAKESHIO 29,200,966 -0.103 
YUKISHIO 29,739,792 0.018 









HARUSHIO 37,402,606 0.218 1.290 
NATSUSHIO 35,477,370 -0.051 
0.036 
HAYASHIO 35,339,722 -0.004 
ARASHIO 35,819,834 0.014 
WAKASHIO 35,975,840 0.004 
HUYUSHIO 35,479,683 -0.014 
04SS 39,879,149 0.124 
05SS 47,013,403 0.179 
AVERAGE 0.075 0.818 0.018 
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TREND AND ESTIMATE OF SHIPBUILDING COST(2/7) 
DD 
Fiscal 
Year NAME REAL VALUE UP RATE 












MAKIGUMO 10,953,853 0.083 
0.082 
ASAGUMO 10,154,748 -0.073 
MINEGUMO 11,023,913 0.086 
NATSUGUMO 10,955,084 -0.006 
MURAKUMO 11,051,293 0.009 
AOKUMO 11,206,156 0.014 
ASAGUMO 11,025,293 -0.016 





TAKATSUKI 14,242,918 0.409 
KIKUZUKI 17,934,419 0.259 
0.111 MOCHIZUKI 18,380,248 0.025 







HATSUYUKI 32,894,496 1.310 
SHIRAYUKI 30,735,065 -0.066 
0.031 
MINEYUKIetc(3) 32,921,674 0.071 
ISOYUKIetc(2) 33,277,788 0.011 
YAMAYUKIetc(Z) 34,437,168 0.035 





ASGIRI 40,359,168 0.227 
YAMAGIRIetc(3) 37,258,776 -0.077 
-0.013 HAMAGIRIetc(3) 38,995,939 0.047 
UMIGIRI 38,674,024 -0.008 
1991 
1992 
HARUSAME 54,485,316 0.350 
04DD 58,593,396 0.075 0.075 
AVERAGE 0.059 0.574 0.057 
DDG 
Fiscal 
Year NAME REAL VALUE UP RATE 
AVE.   UP 
RATE 




TACHIKAZE 31,198,660 1.195 
ASAKAZE 40,308,987 0.292 
0.223 SAWAKAZE 46,479,217 0.153 
1981 
1983 
HATAKAZE 62,670,571 0.348 





KONGOU 113,380,204 0.745 
KIRISHIMA 116,951,534 0.031 
-0.020 03DDG 109,987,409 -0.060 
05DDG 106,492,577 -0.032 
AVERAGE 0.070 0.763 0.080 
124 
TREND AND ESTIMATE OF SHIPBUILDING COST (3/7) 
DDH 
Fiscal 






HIEI 20,746,106 0.010 0.010 
1975 
1976 
SHIRANE 47,666,371 1.322 
KURAMA 48,869,649 0.025 0.025 
AVERAGE 0.018 1.322 0.018 
MSC 
Fiscal 















NINOSHIMA 5,234,636 -0.027 
-0.005 
ENOSHIMA 4,627,083 -0.116 
OOSHIMA 4,583,425 -0.009 
YAKUSHIMA 4,586,628 0.001 
HAHAJIMA 4,723,656 0.030 
NUWAJIMA 4,610,432 -0.024 
KAMISHIMA 4,441,814 -0.037 
OGISHIMA 4,755,414 0.071 
YURISHIMA 4,739,064 -0.003 




UWAJIMA 6,338,990 0.179 
TSUKISHIMA 6,484,507 0.023 
0.055 MAEJIMA 7,046,032 0.087 
AVERAGE 0.005 0.179 0.025 
MSO 
Fiscal 






0.055 HACHIJYOU 15,996,747 0.055 0.055 
MST 
Fiscal 
Year NAME REAL VALUE UP RATE AVE. UP RATE 











MOTOBU 3,809,858 -0.099 




MIURA 6,164,231 0.458 
OJIKA 4,991,647 -0.190 
-0.059 SATSUMA 5,349,459 0.072 
AVERAGE -0.018 0.458 -0.018 
1993 05LST 45,328,886 6.354 6.354 
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TREND AND ESTIMATE OF SHIPBUILDING COST (4/7) 
AOE 
Fiscal 
Year NAME REAL VALUE UP RATE 
AVE.   UP 
RATE 
1976 SAGAMI 15,316,700 
1984 
1987 
TOWADA 18,901,620 0.234 
0.036 TOKIWA   (2) 19,575,901 0.036 
AVERAGE 0.036 0.234 0.036 
ASR 
Fiscal 
Year NAME REAL VALUE UP RATE 
AVE. UP 
RATE 
1981 CHIYODA 18,792,756 1 
ATS 
Fiscal 
Year NAME REAL VALUE UP RATE 
AVE. UP 
RATE 
1967 AZUMA 4,617,798 
1986 KUROBE 14,300,585 2.097 2.097 
AOS 
Fiscal 
Year NAME REAL VALUE UP RATE 
AVE. UP 
RATE 
1989 HIBIKI 13,590,775 
1990 HARIMA 13,451,779 -0.010 -0.010 
AGS 
Fiscal 
Year NAME REAL VALUE UP RATE 
AVE. UP 
RATE 
1967 AKASHI 2,848,478 
1979 SÜMA 5,523,701 0.939 
1976 
1983 
HUTAMI 9,401,465 0.702 
WAKASA 9,044,673 -0.038 -0.038 
AVERAGE -0.038 0.821 -0.038 
ARC 
Fiscal 
Year NAME REAL VALUE UP RATE 
AVE. UP 
RATE 
1977 MUROTO 16,949,896 1 
ASE 
Fiscal 
Year NAME REAL VALUE UP RATE 
AVE. UP 
RATE 
1992 ASUKA 25,079,872 1 
TV 
Fiscal 
Year NAME REAL VALUE UP RATE 
AVE.   UP 
RATE 
1992 KASHIMA 30,873,422 1 
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Note:   Nol=HARUSHIO*1.818 
Others: No.l*1.018-(n-l) 
Note:  Nol='93SSN(USA)*l.041*17 
Others:No.l*1.041-(n-l) 
93 SSN=1,903.2($M) 
1.041 is average of AVE. UP RATE 





















Note:   Nol='93LHD(USA)*l.041*17 
No.2:   No.1*1.041 
•93LHD=1,200($M) 
DD(5,000TON) 
Note:   Nol=KONGOU*1.763 





































Note:   Nol=HATSUYUKI*1.574 


































Note:   Nol=YAEYAMA*l.055"20 










Note:   Nol=MIURA*2*1.458 













Note:   Nol=05LST*1.041A17 
Others:No.1*1.041"(n-1) 
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TREND  AND  ESTIMATE  OF  SHIPBUILDING  COST(7/7) 
ASR 







Note:   Nol=HARUSHIO*l.818/2 






Note:   Nol=HUTAMI*1.82 
No.2:   No.1*1.041 
ASE 
151,693,799] 
Note:   Nol=ASUKA*l.041*18 
ATS 
|37,512,094l 






Note:   Nol=HIBIKI*l.041*20 






Note:   Nol=MUROTO*l.041*23 
No.2:   No.1*1.041 
TV 
| 1 |63,635,271| 
Note:   Nol=1992   TV*1.041*18 




ESTIMATE OF AIRCRAFT PROCURING FLOW(l/3) 
A^C NUMBER ACQU. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 













































A^C MUMBER ACQU. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 








6 1998 i S» 










A7C MUMBER ACQU. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
HH 4 1989 
2 1990 
4 1992 
1 1994  => 






ESTIMATED  OF AIRCRAFT  PROCURING  FLOW(2/3) 
A/C MUHBER ACQU. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 











1997 I 5» 

















A/C HUMBER ACQU. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
U36 1 1986 




1991  => 
1 1994 i A» 






A/C HUMBER ACQU. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2O06 2007 200B 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
UP-3 1 1998  5» 
1 1999 
HUMBER ACQU. 2019 2020 
1 1998 
1 1999 






















ESTIMATE  OF  AIRCRAFT  PROCURING  FLOW   (3/3) 
A/C NUMBER ACQU. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 

























Ä7c NUMBER ACQU. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 




1991  => 




" A7C MUHBER ACQU. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
















A/C MUMBER ACQU. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
HP-3 1 1994 
MUMBER ACQU. 2018 2019 2020 
1 1994 
Hote : This flow ia made by followinq asamption of life of aircraft. 
Fixed Winq : 20 Years 
Helicopter : 15 Years 
Source : KANTEI TO KOKUKI SYU (HEISEI 6 NENDO BAN) (Asagumo Shinbunsya) 
.133 
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APPENDIX  U. 
TREND  AND  ESTIMATE   OF  AIRCRAFT  PROCURING  COST(1/4) 
VP (P-3C) (Real  Value   :   1000  Yen) 
Fiscal Year REAL VALUE UP RATE 
1978 8,166,289 - 
1980 9,963,535 0.220 
1982 11,597,113 0.164 
1983 11,165,871 -0.037 
1984 11,076,263 -0.008 
1985 11,256,776 0.016 
1986 10,386,263 -0.077 
1987 9,372,614 -0.098 
1988 9,082,350 -0.031 
1989 8,841,221 -0.027 
1990 9,603,396 0.086 
1991 9,148,061 -0.047 
1992 10,562,543 0.155 
1993 12,288,140 0.163 
AVE. 0.037 
EP(EP-3) 
Fiscal Year REAL VALUE UP RATE 
1987 11,727,578 - 
1988 10,550,401 -0.100 
1992 12,667,516 0.201 
1993 12,698,413 0.002 
AVE. 0.034 
SH (SH-60J) 
Fiscal Year REAL VALUE UP RATE 
1988 4,343,712 - 
1989 4,370,252 0.006 
1990 4,541,140 0.039 
1991 4,611,005 0.015 
1992 4,635,162 0.005 
1993 5,159,092 0.113 
AVE. 0.036 
MH(MH-53E) 
Fiscal Year REAL VALUE UP RATE 
1986 4,871,008 - 
1987 4,354,679 -0.106 
1989 4,056,597 -0.068 
1991 5,214,284 0.285 
AVE. 0.037 
US(US-IA) 
Fiscal Year REAL VALUE UP RATE 
1977 6,305,290 - 
1978 6,028,043 -0.044 
1979 6,137,966 0.018 
1980 6,211,311 0.012 
1983 5,104,405 -0.178 
1984 5,199,249 0.019 
1986 5,523,479 0.062 
1991 6,350,332 0.150 
1992 6,072,523 -0.044 
1993 6,559,652 0.080 
AVE. 0.008 
UH(UH-60J) 
Fiscal Year REAL VALUE UP RATE 
1989 2,891,633 - 
1991 3,702,335 0.280 
1992 3,969,774 0.072 
1993 3,931,563 -0.010 
AVE. 0.114 
U-36A 
Fiscal Year REAL VALUE UP RATE 
1984 3,735,075 - 
1985 3,918,357 0.049 
1987 2,720,724 -0.306 
1988 2,627,122 -0.034 
1989 2,361,682 -0.101 
1992 1,708,609 -0.277 
AVE. -0.134 
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TREND  AND  ESTIMATE  OF AIRCRAFT  PROCURING  COST   (2/4) 
UP(UP-3) OH-6D 
Fiscal Year NOMINAL VALUE UP RATE 
1994 14,808,000 - 
1995 13,611,000 -0.081 
AVE. 14,209,500 -0.081 
T-5 
Fiscal Year REAL VALUE UP RATE 
1990 380,652 - 
1991 397,688 0.045 
1992 392,486 -0.013 
1993 412,189 0.050 
AVE. 0.027 
TC-90 
Fiscal Year REAL VALUE UP RATE 
1973 413,526 - 
1974 409,057 -0.011 
1977 478,080 0.169 
1978 469,515 -0.018 
1979 387,242 -0.175 
1980 420,635 0.086 
1981 457,303 0.087 
1982 531,867 0.163 
1983 593,269 0.115 
1984 602,406 0.015 
1986 585,912 -0.027 
1992 513,558 -0.123 
AVE. 0.026 
LC-90 
Fiscal Year REAL VALUE UP RATE 
1987 523,946 - 
1989 449,431 -0.142 
1990 495,558 0.103 
AVE. -0.020 
Fiscal Year REAL VALUE UP RATE 
1982 212,639 - 
1983 260,801 0.226 
1984 230,866 -0.115 
1987 227,771 -0.013 
1989 194,379 -0.147 
1992 228,344 0.175 
AVE. 0.025 
NP-3 
Fiscal Year REAL VALUE UP RATE 
1991 7,631,391 - 











Note:   Negative up rates 
are ignored 
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TREND AND ESTIMATE OF AIRCRAFT PROCURING COST (3/4) 
VP 









































1- 4 13,247,335 







1- 2 7,411,741 
3- 4 7,693,387 
















Note:   No.1=U-36A(1992)*1.038*17 
Oth« 
T-5 
1-  2 777,054 







Note:   No.1-2=T-5(1993)*1.038*17 
Others=No.l*1.038*(n-l) 
LC-90 
1-  2 1,044,820 
3-  4 1,084,523 
TOTAL 4,258,687 
AVE. 1,064,672 












Note:   No.l='92  C-130*l.038*18 
Others=No.l*1.038*(n-l) 






Note:   No.l=UP-3(1994)*1.038*20 
Others=No.l*1.038*(n-l) 
TC-90 







Note:   No.l=TC-90(1992)*1.038*18 
Others=No.l*1.038*(n-l) 
OH-6D 
1-  2 446,830 
3 463,809 
4-  5 481,434 
6-  7 499,728 
8-  9 518,718 
TOTAL 4,357,229 
AVE. 484,137 
Note:   No.l=OH-6D(1992)*l.038*18 
Others=No.l*1.038*(n-l) 
VFA 











No.l-5='92   AV-8B(USA)*1.038*18 
Others=No.l*1.038*(n-l) 
92  AV-6B=45($M) 
Sourse : Kaijojieitai Yosan Jimuteiyo (Kaijobakuryokanbu) 
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